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I.

INTRODUCTION

Commenting on the religious protection guaranteed by the First
Amendment in an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, Thomas
Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies
solely between man and his God; that he owes account to
none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative
powers of the Government reach actions only, and not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act
of the whole American people which declared that their
Legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between
Church and State. '

*Assistant Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University; J.S.M, Stanford University, 1999; J.D., cum laude, Indiana University, 1998; M.S.,
Biological Sciences, University of Notre Dame, 1995; B.S., Physics, Rose-Hulman Institute of
Technology, 1991.
'Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting then President Jefferson's letter
to the Danbury Baptist Association dated Jan. 1, 1802); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling Jefferson's letter a "short note of courtesy" and
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With that passage, Mr. Jefferson unwittingly penned a metaphor,
the "wall of separation between church and state," that is presently
enshrined in the pantheon of legal prose among a select group of
phrases such as Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal ' 2 and
criminal law's "reasonable doubt."3 Each of these phrases earns its
exalted position because each captures the essence of an issue that
plagues society. The racial inequality given formal sanction in
Plessy's now abandoned "separate but equal" doctrine continues to
be a thorn in our nation's side, while advances in DNA testing
expose the disturbingly thin veneer of protection offered by the
"reasonable doubt" standard, thereby triggering questions about
criminal justice in general.4 Similarly, the dimensions of Mr.
noting that it was written fourteen years after the passage of the Bill of Rights); Arlin M. Adams
& Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1565-66
(1989) (pointing out that the famous "wall of separation" metaphor was coined by Roger
Williams over 150 years prior to Jefferson's usage of it).
2
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 537-64 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana law providing for
segregated facilities on trains for passengers). The Court wrote that the goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but
in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
Id. at 544. From this case, then, emerged the "separate but equal" doctrine, which was written as
"equal but separate" in the case, but has mutated over time).
3
See generally SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES (6th ed., Aspen 1995).
4
For some recent work on race and equality, see DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (examining the role of race in
criminal justice by exploring topics such as racial profiling); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY
COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY, 1890-2000 (2001). For pieces discussing wrongful
convictions that result from the failure of the criminal justice system and its reasonable doubt
standard, see generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Yale Univ. Press 1932); BARRY SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000);
Gary Spencer, $1.5 Million for Convicted Rapist for Earlier Mistaken Prosecution, N.Y. L.J.,
July 23, 1997, at I (reporting on the unjust rape conviction and compensation of Kerry Kotler);
Lisa W. Foderaro, DNA Frees Convicted Rapist After Nine Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1991, at
B 1, availableat LEXIS, News Library (recounting the reversal of the rape conviction of Charles
Dabbs); Barton Gellman, DNA Test Clears Man Convicted of SE Rape; Move Keeps Findings
out of D.C. Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1990, at A12, available at LEXIS, News Library
(recounting the rape case against Edward Green); J. Michael Kennedy, DNA Test Clears Man
Convicted ofRape Counts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at B 1, available at LEXIS, News Library
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Jefferson's metaphorical First Amendment protection are the
subjects of frequent public controversy. The sheer number of
newspaper articles that address the issue of the separation of church
and state demonstrates the degree to which the topic permeates
public discourse.5 In short, the wall between church and state

(documenting the facts surrounding the arrest and exoneration of Mark Bravo); Larry King,
Salvaged by Science: DNA Helps Set the Innocent Free, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May
14, 1995, at A22, availableat LEXIS, News Library (reporting on the releases of Garrett Davis
and David Shepard); James F. McCarty, DNA Test Lets Prisoner Go Home, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 17, 1994, at AI, availableat LEXIS, News Library (recalling the release
of Brian Piszczek after DNA tests); James Thorne, DNA Test Frees Innocent Man, NEWS &
REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), July 1, 1995, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library (documenting
the arrest and exoneration of Ronald Cotton following a rape conviction).
5
Steven Conn, Religion Is Best Left out of this Nation's Public Discourse, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, July 3, 2002, at I IA, available at LEXIS, News Library (reacting to the Newdow v.
United States Congress, 492 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) decision regarding the constitutionality of
the Pledge of Allegiance); Alan Cooperman, DeLay Criticizedfor "Only Christianity" Remarks,
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2002, at A5, available at LEXIS, News Library (recounting the criticism
aimed at a member of the House of Representatives who said that only Christianity offered
reasonable answers regarding the purpose of life); David Fisher, Council Will Pray... to
Whomever; Marysville Invocation Must Be 'Non-Denominational,'but Deity's Name Is Allowed,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 27, 2002, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library
(examining the issue of a town council's use of prayer in light of church-state principles); Josh
Loftin, Civil Rights Under Fire,ACLU Chief Says, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), May
3, 2002, at B2, available at LEXIS, News Library (noting a lawsuit regarding the sale of a piece
of property to the Mormon Church that is alleged to have violated the separation of church and
state); Anthony Lonetree & James Walsh, State Senate Backs Pledge Bill; The Measure, Which
Would Require at Least Weekly Recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, PassedAfter a Debate on
the Nature of Loyalty, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 26, 2002, at LA, available at
LEXIS, News Library; Cody Lowe, Prayer in School? No Problem, Says Ex-Lobbyist,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Apr. 28, 2002, Sec. Extra, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library; Stephen Ohlemacher, Moments of Silence Approved for Schools; Taft Expected to Sign
Compromise Measure, PLAIN DEALER (Columbus, Ohio), Apr. 24, 2002, at Al, available at
LEXIS, News Library; Rosanna Ruiz, School Prayer a Legal Footballfor Santa Fe; Court
Allows Latest Suit to Proceed, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 13, 2002, at A36, available at LEXIS,
News Library (discussing a lawsuit by a high school student alleging that a ban on pre-game
messages violated her First Amendment rights); Liz Sidoti, States Debate School Moments of
Silence, CHI. TRtB., May 19, 2002, Zone C, at 10, available at LEXIS, News Library; Peter
Steinfels, Beliefs; Behind the Concept of the Separation of Church and State, a Scholar Finds
Some Unsettling Origins, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2002, at B5, available at LEXIS, News Library;
Gayle White, Jefferson Letter Has Unusual History; "Wall of Separation" Wasn 't Only Thing on
President's Plate, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 6, 2002, at 1B, available at LEXIS, News Library
(discussing the circumstances of Jefferson writing the well-known phrase).
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divides people from Wisconsin 6 to Florida 7 and from North
Carolina 8 to California. 9
Lying at the heart of the reasons for the ever-present focus on
church/state issues is the politicization of religious faith. Organized

religious groups routinely inject religion into secular issues such as
abortion or tax reform by commenting on them from a religious
viewpoint. 0
Moreover, some Christians are members of the
6

See, e.g., Anita Clark, Faith-Based Charity: It's Controversial,but Not New; Wisconsin
Has Seen Several Programs and Has Seen the Church-State Issue Raised in Court, WIS. ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 2001, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library; Peter Mailer, Speaker Promises to Stay
off Religion; ChristianSays He Can Still Be Effective at Public High School, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 2002, at IB, available at LEXIS, News Library (describing a speaker's
efforts to refrain from discussing religious topics in public schools in order to prevent a violation
of the separation between church and state).
7See, e.g., Roger Bull, Is Anything the Matter With Our Motto? "In God We Trust" Inspires
Discussion, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville, Fla.), May 13, 2002, at Cl, available at LEXIS,
News Library; Thomas B. Pfankuch, Faith-BasedPrison Dorms, Programs Raise Questions,
FLA. TtMES-UNION (Jacksonville, Fla.), Apr. 29, 2002, at B 1, availableat LEXIS, News Library
(discussing a program allowing religious inmates to be housed in a separate dorm that is less
crowded and the complaint that the program may violate the separation between church and
state); Lois K. Solomon, Battle over Student-Led Prayer at Graduations Starts to Heat up,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 31, 2002, at IA,availableat LEXIS, News Library.
8
See, e.g., Sherry Jones, Pledge Ban Elicits Strong Feelings from Area, MORNING STAR
(Wilmington, N.C.), June 28, 2002, at IA, available at LEXIS, News Library (discussing
reaction to the Newdow decision); Todd Silberman, Bill Allows Display of Bible Tenets, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 13, 2001, at AI, availableat LEXIS, News Library (examining
a proposal that would allow the posting of the Ten Commandments in schools in possible
violation of the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent).
9
See, e.g., Richard Fausset, CharterSchools and Wall of Separation; Education: Religious
Groups Operating Tax-Supported Campuses Have Won Praisefrom Some, but Critics Question
the Church-State Ties, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, Sec. Metro, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library; Charles Levendosky, Voucher Ruling Sidesteps Constitution, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 7, 2002, at G4, available at LEXIS, News Library; Mike Lynch, Free to Choose; Supreme
Court's Decision on Vouchers Is a Victory for Children, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 7, 2002,
at G4, available at LEXIS, News Library.
"°See Curt Anderson, Religion; Bills Would Let Churches Be More Politically Active, L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 2002, Part 2, at 21, available at LEXIS, News Library (describing not only the
Christian Coalition's support for tax reform, but also the opposition of other religious groups to
the proposed reform); Juliet Eilperin, GOP Seeks to Ease Curbs on Churches in Politics, WASH.
POST, June 3, 2002, at A4, available at LEXIS, News Library (noting the staunch anti-abortion
stance of the Traditional Values Coalition); Michael Tackett, Bush Keeps GOP Conservatives
Happy; Unlike His Father,President Follows Reagan's Example, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2002,
Zone C, at 9, available at LEXIS, News Library (commenting on the President's stance on
abortion to keep conservative support).
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so-called "Christian Coalition," a group with an overt political
agenda and whose head, Gary Bauer, ran for the presidency in
2000." Further cementing the nexus between politics and religion,
political candidates recognize the block of votes held by various
religious groups and are more than willing to invoke religion on the
campaign trail.12 During the most recent presidential election, for
example, then Texas Governor George W. Bush named "Christ" as
his "favorite political philosopher" while then Vice-President Al
Gore followed suit by announcing that he was a "born-again
Christian" who frequently queried to himself "W.W.J.D."' 3 While
such statements may not be affirmative efforts to gain votes, like
touting one's record of political achievement, they are efforts, at the
very least, to avoid the political death penalty that would inevitably
result from being labeled as "anti-religious." 14
Given the link between religious faith and politics prior to an
election, religion historically follows those elected into legislative
halls and serves as a significant influence on policy. On the positive
side of the historical scale, religious fervor not only ignited the call
to abolish slavery in the eighteenth century, 15 but also fueled the
social changes brought about during the Civil Rights movement of
the 1960s. 16 On the negative end of the historical scale, however,
religion has also been a platform for intolerance. During the colonial
period, legal unions between church and government existed in at
least nine of the thirteen colonies and many of these colonies
discriminated against followers of religions without official
"Nina J. Easton, The Power and the Glory; Who Needs the ChristianCoalition When You've
Got the White House? The Religious Right's Covert Crusade, AM. PROSPECT, May 20, 2002 at
20, availableat 2002 WL 7761447.
121d.
3

Maureen Dowd, Liberties; Playing the Jesus Card, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999, at A23,
available at LEXIS, News Library (the acronym "W.W.J.D." stands for "What Would Jesus
Do?").
14See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, Section 1, at 10, available at
LEXIS, News Library (noting the view of one columnist that the United States is "drenched in
religion").
5
Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIz. L. REV.
293, 305-06 (2002) (describing the relationship between religion and the abolition of slavery).
16Steven A. Delchin, Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie With the Academic and Law School
Elite; It Is an Abomination-Romer v. Evans and America's Culture War, 47 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 207, 248 (1996) (noting that religion played a significant role in advancing civil rights
during the 1960s).
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sanction. 17 So, for example, courts in colonial Virginia defined
some Baptist preaching as criminal and punishable by up to five
months in jail. 18 Similarly, a 1702 Connecticut statute barred
citizens from entertaining "any Quaker, Ranter, Adamite, or other
notorious heretic,"19and Maryland enacted laws to limit the influence
of Catholicism within its borders.2" Despite the positive social
changes traceable to the 1960s and the absence of governmental
sanction, some modem religious sects continue to suffer
discrimination in many aspects of life.21 Ironically, the mixture of
religion and politics simultaneously possesses the power to combat
grave social ills and to divide society into segments thereby
increasing social conflict.
As evidence of its historical ability to create a societal schism,
members of the religious majority ran roughshod over adherents of
minority faiths in the political arena prior to the passage of the
Establishment Clause. In fact, early Americans apparently worried
little about the separation between the secular and the sectarian
because the "overwhelming majority" of colonists were Protestant
Christians.22 John Adams remarked that Catholics were as rare as

17LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
1-11 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that the colonies "discriminated against Roman Catholics, Jews, and
even dissenting Protestants who refused to comply with local laws benefiting establishments of
religion." Id. at 1. Further asserting that four of the colonies-Rhode Island, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and New Jersey-never had an established religion while New Hampshire had a
"diversified and uniquely American" establishment. Id. at 11.).
'1Id. at 3 (listing the failure to preach from the Anglican Book of Common Prayer and failure
to attend services of the established church as criminal acts in Virginia at the time).
19THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 79 (1986) (also noting that Massachusetts could impose the
death sentence upon Quakers who refused banishment). Id. at 22.
2
1d. at 51 (observing that the law excluded Catholics from public office, prevented them
from being lawyers, and prohibited priests from converting citizens or baptizing children except
those of Catholic parents); see also, e.g., ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (5th ed. 1996)
(noting that Catholics were prohibited from even entering Massachusetts under penalty of death).
21
See generally United States v. Columbus Country Club, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16438, at
*1-5 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (housing discrimination against non-Catholics); U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION: A NEGLECTED ISSUE 88-94, 259-79 (1979)
(describing discrimination against Jews and Catholics in matters of employment).
22
See CURRY, supra note 19, at 218 (stating that "[a]fter a century and a half of colonial
settlement in which the overwhelming majority of citizens were Protestant, a contemporary
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comets in Braintree, Massachusetts, 23 and the failure to subscribe to
any religious faith during this period was akin to a failure to believe
that gravity existed.24 The marriage of religion and politics during
this period simply paved the way for the discriminatory laws like
those in Virginia, Connecticut, and Maryland.25 Although the
disparity is not as great as during colonial times, a recent U.S. News
& World Report survey reported that Christianity remains the
26
predominant religion of choice for the people of this country.
According to that survey, 84.2% of the adult population (159 million
adults) is Christian while adherents of all other religions combined
account for only 6.5% of the adult population.2 7 On the other end of

the religious spectrum or lack thereof, 7.6% of the survey's28
respondents claimed to follow no religious creed whatsoever.
Because the number of adherents of non-Christian religions is rising,
however, the religious profile of the nation is becoming increasingly
diversified.29
Given the lopsided disparity in these statistics and despite the
Establishment Clause, modem politically active members of the
majority faith predictably try to flex their political muscles in an
attempt to gain political weight. But unlike the warm reception that
greeted the religious majority during the colonial era, the
Jeffersonian wall erected in the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment provides a substantial obstacle to obtaining the
government's imprimatur for the majority religion. The
Establishment Clause declares that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." 30 Recognizing the risks
would in many instances have been hard put to define where Protestantism ended and secular life
began.").
23

JAMES HENNESEY,

AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC

COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (1981) (citing 9 John Adams, Works 355 (C. Adams ed.,
Boston 1856)).
24

JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD,

WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN

AMERICA 44 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1985) (1946) (observing that disbelief during this
period required a divorce from reality).
25
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
26 Jeffrey L. Sheler, Faith in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 6, 2002 at 40, 43.
271d
28

1d. (1.9% of the survey's respondents had no answer).
1d. (the total number of non-Christians in the year 2000 was 13.4 million represented by

29

Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs in descending order of percentage of population).
30

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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associated with religious influence in government and vice versa, the
Supreme Court declared that the Establishment Clause extracts
religion "from the vicissitudes of political controversy" and places it
"beyond the reach of majorities and officials." 31 In light of the
increasing religious pluralism of this nation, the Establishment
Clause "helps to defuse a potentially explosive situation" by
substantially, but 32certainly not entirely, removing religion from
political elections.
Since religion cannot be entirely eliminated from the political
realm, the intersecting orbits of religion and politics ultimately
produce a sectarian competition for political gain where the "zeal for
different opinions concerning religion... [has] divided mankind
into parties ... and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
33
oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good.Moreover, the division of citizens into religious factions that "vex
and oppress" one another for political ends exacts a substantial toll
on society because the clash inevitably creates winners and losers
based upon the number of adherents, information, wealth, or the like.
Indeed, James Madison forewarned that the majority "may employ
Religion as an engine of Civil policy" to reduce "from the equal rank
of Citizens all those whose opinions in religion do not bend to those
of the Legislative authority. 34 Attesting to the endurance of the
problem identified long ago by Madison, Justice O'Connor
recognized "the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular
or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and
the Amish" in a 1990 case. 35 Thus, sectarian contests for political
clout are simply manifestations of a basic societal conflict-the
majority versus the minority-that risks the political
disempowerment of adherents of minority religions.

31

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (discussing the purpose of
the entire Bill of Rights); see also Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,432-33 (1962).
32
See supra note 17 at xiii.
33
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
34
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in BASIC
7-9, 11 (Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, 1965).
35
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(specifically discussing the burdens on the named religions in terms of the free exercise of their
religions).
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
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Amid the numerous church/state clashes between members of the
majority and minority religions that encompass a spectrum of issues
ranging from education 36 to the Pledge of Allegiance, 37 controversies

involving the connection between government and Christian
symbols on public property increasingly capture the attention of the
nation. 38 One of the most publicized controversies surrounding a
display of a religious symbol involved Alabama's Judge Roy Moore
36

See, e.g., James Dillard, In Virginia, a Tuition Tax Credit Is More Likely, WASH. POST,
July 7, 2002, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library (discussing the ramifications of the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold an Ohio school voucher program in light of the separation of
church and state in Virginia's constitution); Jeanette Faulkner, Voucher Ruling Is a Land-Mine
Decision for Christian Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 6, 2002, at 4G, available at
LEXIS, News Library; Andrew Greeley, School Choice Shouldn't Involve Religion, TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y.), July 6, 2002, at A7, availableat LEXIS, News Library; Jodie Morse, A
Victory for Vouchers; the Supreme Court Upholds School Choice. But Will Its Decision be the
Final Word on Education Reform?, TIME, July 8, 2002, at 32, available at LEXIS, News Library
(discussing the Supreme Court's decision to uphold a voucher program in Ohio); Richard
Rothstein, Defining FailedSchools Is Harder Than It Sounds, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, Sec. B,
at 9, available at LEXIS, News Library (stating that the Supreme Court ventured beyond its
knowledge by upholding the voucher program in Ohio).
37
See, e.g., Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the 1954 Act of Congress that added the words "under God" to the Pledge and the practice of
teacher-led recitation of the Pledge utilizing the words "under God" violated the Establishment
Clause); see also Howard Fineman, One Nation, Under... Who?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at
20, available at 2002 WL 7294585 (examining the political implications of the Newdow
decision); Ellen Goodman, Reasonable Pledge Ruling Stirs Divisiveness, DESERET NEWS (Salt
Lake City, Utah), July 5, 2002, at A17, available at LEXIS, News Library; John Leo, Folly
Iround the Flag,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 15, 2002, at 4, available at 2002 WL 8430747
(calling the 9th Circuit decision a "howler").
38
See, e.g., Nick Anderson, Ten Commandments Proposal Illustrates Peril to Politicians,
L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1999, at A5, available at LEXIS, News Library; E.J. Dionne, Jr., Whose
Commandments?, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2002, at A21, available at LEXIS, News Library;
Steve Gushee, Keeping Commandments a Tall Order, PALM BEACH POST, June 19, 1999, at 4D,
available at LEXIS, News Library; Rev. Brian Henry, The Plaque Should Stay, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 2001, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library; Chris Joyner, County
Won't Appeal Ruling, CHATTANOOGA TIMES/CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, May 16, 2002, at B 1,
available at LEXIS, News Library; Michael Pearson, Battle Raging over Ten Commandments,
DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Nov. 13, 1999, at A9, availableat LEXIS, News Library;
John Rivera, Push for Posting 10 Commandments Gaining in States; "Hang Ten " Campaign
Seeks to Bypass Church-State Issue, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 14, 2000, at IA, available at LEXIS,
News Library; Rick Wagner, Will Ten Commandments PlaqueRemain?; Sullivan Attorney Says
It's UnclearIf AG's Ruling Covers County Display, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (Va.), Apr. 8,
2002; Jonathan Zimmerman, Commandments' Foes Miss Point, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar.
21, 2002, at 20A, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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and his posting of a plaque enumerating the Ten Commandments
behind his bench.3 9 Judge Moore's display and subsequent litigation
in both federal and state courts ignited the passions of those on both
sides of the debate, including those of then Governor Fob James who
said that "[t]he only way that the Ten Commandments.... will be
stripped from Alabama's courts will be a force of arms." 40 After
being dismissed for the plaintiffs' lack of standing in the Northern
District of Alabama, 4 ' the case wound its way around the state court
system and the Alabama Supreme Court eventually dismissed the
case. 42 And outside of the courtroom setting, the scores of
39

See generally Ala. Freethought Ass'n v. Moore, 893 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (the
case also involved the use of prayer prior to court sessions); see also Alabama ex. rel. James v.
ACLU, 711 So. 2d 952, 959 (Ala. 1998) (stating that the Moore litigation had "[flrom its
inception... attracted the attention of the national news media, as well as that of the local
media").
4
°Sandee Richardson, James Denounces Courtroom Prayer Ruling, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, February 6, 1997, at 2B. Furthermore, Governor James made numerous other
comments about the case. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, Judge Allows God's Law to Mix with
Alabama's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at A14, available at LEXIS, News Library (recounting
statements by Gov. James where the refusal to accept removal is comparable to Lincoln's refusal
to accept slavery); Sandee Richardson, Hundreds Rally in Support of Judge in Prayer Case,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Sept. 12, 1996, at 1A (describing a rally in support of Judge Moore
and an address by Gov. James during which he claimed he would use all legal means, including
Alabama police and members of the Alabama National Guard, to prevent the removal of the
plaque).
41
Moore, 893 F. Supp. at 1542-43.
42
State ex. rel. James, 711 So. 2d at 958,977;
Sandee Richardson, Before the Rally
Thousands Gather in Support of Judge, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Apr. 12, 1997, at IA
(noting that Judge Moore received the support of three congressman and the Christian Coalition).
In the state court system, the case took a circuitous route to its ultimate conclusion. On
November 22, 1996, Circuit Court Judge Charles Price ruled that the Ten Commandments
display did not violate the Constitution. State ex rel. James, 711 So. 2d at 959. However, the
ACLU then asked that Judge Price view the actual display in the courtroom setting instead of
relying on the evidence of it used at trial. See Sandee Richardson, ACLU Continues Battle with
Judge, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Nov. 23, 1996, at IA. After so doing, Judge Price reversed
himself and found that the display violated the Constitution. See State ex rel. James, 711 So. 2d
at 959. The Alabama Supreme Court issued a stay in the ruling the following day. See Sandee
Richardson, High Court Ruling Delays Ten Commandments Case, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER,
Feb. 20, 1997, at IA. Between the time of the stay and the eventual dismissal, Judge Moore
gained the support of both the local community and those in Washington. See Sandee
Richardson, Rally Draws Thousands; Judge Defends Right of Religion, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Apr. 13, 1997, at IA. Recently, a federal court ordered Judge Moore to remove
the monument from the courthouse. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala.
2002). The court found the monument's non-secular purpose and advancement of religion to be
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monuments on public lands that enumerate the Ten Commandments
serve as lighting rods for controversy and subsequent litigation. In
fact, a nationwide call to post the Ten Commandments on
government property is conducted in a systematic fashion by
43
organized groups

such as the Ten Commandments

Project.

Unsurprisingly, court dockets teem with cases
involving displays
44
utilizing religious symbols on public property.
"self-evident." Id. at 1299. As a result, the court declared that "overwhelming" evidence existed
to show that the monument violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1293. However, an appeal
from this decision is planned.
Jeffrey Gettleman, Judge's Biblical Monument Ruled
Unconstitutional,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, at Al.
43
John Rivera, ChristiansPushing to "Hang Ten ", DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah),
Feb. 26, 2000, at El, available at 2000 WL 15418337 (listing "Hang Ten" as another organized
group promoting monuments that enumerate the Ten Commandments).
"See generally ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999) (involving a holiday display
at Christmas); Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997) (objecting to a Ten
Commandments display in a county courthouse); Carpenter v. City & County of San Francisco,
93 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 1996) (regarding a challenge to a large cross on a mountain designated as
public property); Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (displaying a
menorah during Chanukah); Gonzales v. N. Township, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993) (challenge to
a crucifix in a public park); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving
a challenge to a Christmas display on public property); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518
(9th Cir. 1993) (consolidation of various challenges seeking the removal of two crosses built on
public property overlooking the city and a cross in a town emblem); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611
(7th Cir. 1992) (protesting an outdoor display of sixteen paintings of Christ in a public park
during the Christmas season); Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving a
challenge to a biblical statuary display in a municipal park); ACLU v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098
(6th Cir. 1990) (challenging the display of a manger scene on the grounds of the capitol at
Christmas); Smith v. County of Albermarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990) (challenging the
placement of a creche on the lawn of a county office building); Kaplan v. City of Burlington,
891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989) (display of a menorah in City Hall Park); ACLU v. City of St.
Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) (protesting the display of a lighted cross on fire station at
Christmas); ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir.
1983) (involving the display of a Latin cross in a state park); ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F.
Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) (objecting to the display of the Ten Commandments in three
Tennessee courthouses); Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 194 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Penn.
2002) (challenging a Ten Commandments plaque on the county courthouse); ACLU v. City of
Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (Neb. 2002) (challenging a Ten Commandments marker in a
public park); ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (granting
preliminary injunction directing the removal of Ten Commandments displays from schools and
courthouses); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (request and
grant of an injunction against the display of the Ten Commandments on the courthouse lawn);
Doe v. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (challenging a Ten
Commandments display at a local school); ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D.
Ky. 2000) (request for injunction against a Ten Commandments display at the county
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the issue of displaying
religious symbols on public property, specifically those involving
the Ten Commandments, and the resulting confrontation between the
Establishment and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
Part II of this piece traces the roller coaster history of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence from its early beginnings up through its
modem interpretations. Of particular importance are the two
seminal cases that describe Establishment Clause protection in cases
involving displays that include religious symbols-Lynch v.
Donnelly45 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU of Pittsburgh.46 Part
III describes the clash between the Establishment and Free Speech
Clauses prompted by groups that advocate placing monuments
containing religious symbols on public property. In addition, Part III
presents the Supreme Court's resolution of the intra-First
Amendment conflict spawned by displaying religious symbols on
public property, elucidated in Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette.47 Part IV argues that the balance between
establishment and free speech measured in Pinette spurs a sectarian
competition for display space on the public lawn that is played on a
non-neutral, majority-dominated field in violation of Establishment
Clause principles. To readjust the First Amendment scales, this
paper concludes that permanent, unattended monuments carrying
religious messages should be barred from public property pursuant
to the government's authority to enact reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions on speakers using public property.
courthouse); Harvey v. Cobb, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (regarding a challenge to a Ten
Commandments display); Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (challenging
the display of two Latin crosses in a public park on printed materials associated with the city);
Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (protesting the display of a
Latin cross on a city water tower); Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3 (D.C.
1988) (challenging a sixty-five-foot Latin cross displayed on a United States naval base in
Hawaii); Freedom from Religion Found. v. Zielke, 663 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Wis. 1987)
(objections to a Ten Commandments monument in a city park); ACLU v. Miss. State Gen.
Servs. Admin., 652 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (involving a lighted cross on state-owned
property during Christmas); ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (an objection
to three crosses and a Star of David in a public park); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of
Eugene, 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976) (involving the erection of a large Latin cross in a municipal
park).
45465 U.S. 668, 668-727 (1984).
46492 U.S. 573, 573-679 (1989).
41515 U.S. 753, 759 (1995).
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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

Reflecting the confusion within Establishment Clause doctrine,
individuals who disagree about most other legal topics agree that
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is mind-numbingly jumbled.48
The confusion regarding the Establishment Clause is ultimately
traceable to its text: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."4 9 The esoteric, open-ended nature of that
curt commandment automatically creates questions regarding what
constitutes religion and what constitutes an establishment. 50 Beyond
those definitional inquiries, the vague language of the Establishment
Clause has spawned a variety of academic interpretations as to what
the clause actually means. 51 According to the Supreme Court,
however, the Establishment Clause "preclude[s] government from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred., 52 In other words,
the government is prohibited from exhibiting favoritism either
4

Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment

Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 956 (1989) ("[T]he Supreme Court's establishment clause
jurisprudence has unified critical opinion: people who disagree about nearly everything else in
the law agree that establishment doctrine is seriously, perhaps distinctively, defective.").
49
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5
For commentary on what constitutes religion, see, for example, Jesse H. Choper, Defining
"Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579 (1982); George C. Freeman, III,
The MisguidedSearch for the ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion, "71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983);
Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under
the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990); Kent Greenawalt,
Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984). For commentary
regarding what constitutes an establishment, see, for example, Arlin M. Adams & Charles J.
Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559 (1989); William W. Van
Alstyne, What is "An Establishment of Religion "?,65 N.C. L. REV. 909 (1987).
51
See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (arguing that the Establishment
Clause bans forcing citizens to support religion with tax money or coercing them to change or
participate in religious practices); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False
Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 922 (1986) (arguing for

governmental neutrality toward religion and among religions);

Michael W. McConnell,

Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 938 (1986)
(maintaining that the Establishment Clause prohibits aid to religion that coerces nonbelievers);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 195-197 (1992)
(taking a separationist view between church and state). See generally,Jesse H. Choper, Securing
Religious Liberty: Principlesfor JudicialInterpretationof the Religion Clauses.
52

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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among religious sects or between religion and nonreligion.53 Despite
the Court's seemingly straightforward interpretation, the journey
traversed by the Establishment Clause through the judicial system
has been, to say the least, rather tortured. At its worst, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is characterized as "embarrassing," 54 and at its
best it is described as having "produced only consistent
unpredictability."55
A. The Pre-Lynch Evolution of the Establishment Clause
Prior to 1947, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of the
Establishment Clause in a scant few cases.56 In Bradfieldv. Roberts,
a taxpayer sought to enjoin a federal grant for a hospital operated by
the Little Sisters of Charity, a Roman Catholic charity
organization.5 7 The Court dismissed the challenge by characterizing
the hospital as a "secular corporation being managed by people who
hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church" rather than a
sectarian enterprise.58 Later, the Court again tangentially confronted
an Establishment Clause issue in Quick Bear v. Leupp.5 9 In Quick
Bear, members of the Sioux Indian Tribe alleged that the money
distributed from its own trust to pay for Catholic schools in the area
violated various Indian appropriation acts that banned sectarian
expenditures. 60 The
Court
acknowledged
the
legitimate
constitutional concerns implicated by the facts, but nevertheless
found that the appropriation acts did not apply to monies earmarked
for an Indian tribe by a treaty between the tribe and the United
States.61
53

Sch. Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Tex. Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("government may not favor
religious belief over disbelief').
54
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"5Wallace,472 U.S. at 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Mark Tushnet, The
Constitution of Religion, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 701, 701 (1986) (declaring that the law concerning
religion and the Constitution is in "significant disarray").
56
Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (2000)
(stating that "the Establishment Clause lay substantially dormant" before the Everson case in
1947).
57175 U.S. 291, 292 (1899).
58
1d. at 298-300.
59210
U.S. 50, 77-82 (1908).
6
ld. at 52-53 (the Indian appropriation acts involved those of 1895-98 inclusive).
61
1d. at 80-82.
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Following these cursory examinations of Establishment
Clause issues, the Court authored its first formal foray into the
jungle of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Everson v. Board of
Education.6 2 Everson involved a state and federal constitutional
challenge to a municipal government decision that allowed parents
to be reimbursed for expenditures made in conjunction with
transporting their children to and from schools, including Catholic
parochial schools. 63
In upholding the constitutionality of the
reimbursement program under the Establishment Clause, the Court
described its view of the Establishment Clause and laid the
foundation for the modem dissension regarding Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 64 Borrowing from Mr. Jefferson, the Court
opined that the Establishment Clause meant "at least" that:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect a
'wall of separation between church and State.' 65
Following its quasi-adoption of a strict separationist position in
Everson, the Court quickly muddied the waters of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in subsequent decisions. In McCollum v.
Board of Education, decided just one year after Everson, the Court
struck down a public school program that provided for one hour of
U.S. 1, 5 (1947).
1d. at 3 (the state was New Jersey).

62330
63

64Id. 8-18.
1d. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
6
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religious instruction per week by sectarian teachers in public school
classrooms.66 The Court maintained that the "wall of separation"
created by the Establishment Clause "must be kept high and
impregnable" 67 and eschewed the notion that the First Amendment
banned "only government preference of one religion over another"
from a historical perspective. 68 Despite agreeing that the program of
religious instruction violated the Establishment Clause, the Justices
reached no agreement on the dimensions of the wall of separation
and, in fact, wrote four separate opinions regarding the need for the
barrier. 69 After public outcry against the decision in McCollum, the
Court upheld a similar program against an Establishment Clause
challenge in Zorach v. Clauson because the religious instruction in
Zorach, unlike that in McCollum, took place away from public
school grounds at a private locale]v° The Court reasoned that the
First Amendment did not stand for the proposition that "in every and
'
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State."
Furthermore, the Court observed that if it adopted a strict
separationist view of Establishment Clause protection, then "all
other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our
public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First
Amendment., 7 2 After all, said the Court, "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."7 3 In the
end, Zorach counseled that McCollum's "impregnable" wall of
separation could be breached in certain situations.7 4

66333 U.S. 203, 205-12 (1948) (arguing that the First Amendment banned religious
instruction under the auspices of"[t]he operation of the State's compulsory education system").
67
1d. at 212.
6
81d. at 211; see also id. at 241 (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that history shows that

religious instruction is not prohibited by the First Amendment).
69
Compare id. at 212 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Jackson, Rutledge, and
Burton), with id. at 232 (Jackson, J. concurring separately), and id at 238 (Reed, J., dissenting).
'0343 U.S. 306, 308-10, 315 (1952).
"Id. at 312 (continuing "[r]ather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in
which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other."); but see id at 316-17
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the program unconstitutionally mixed religion and the state
by using "the State's compulsory public school machinery," a phrase borrowed from McCollum,
for religious ends).
72
1d at 313.
73

Id.

74

See id. at 315.
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As the number of Establishment Clause cases that reached the
Court increased, particularly since its Everson decision, the Court
refined its analysis in four important cases that spanned the 1960s. 75
In McGowan v. Maryland, the Court fielded an Establishment
Clause challenge to Sunday closing laws that prohibited commercial
sales on Sundays and coincidentally matched the designated days of
rest for Christian religions. 76 Responding to the challenge, Maryland
argued that the laws had a secular purpose, which was "to set one
day apart from all others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and
tranquility.",7' The Court agreed with the state of Maryland and
found that its law had a secular purpose; therefore, the state's78
Sunday closing laws did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Two years later, the Court expanded its McGowan decision in
School Districtv. Schempp.79 In Schempp, the Court struck down a
Pennsylvania law that required public school children to read "[a]t
least ten verses from the Holy Bible" and recite the Lord's Prayer at
the beginning of each school day. 80 The Court found that the
opening exercises were undeniably religious and violated the
neutrality that the First Amendment required of the government.8 1
To that end, the Court announced that "to withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
82
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Notably, the Court confirmed its commitment to examine the effects
of a purported Establishment Clause violation later that same year in
Board of Education v. Allen by stating that the principal or primary
effect of legislation must be one that neither promotes nor hinders
religion.83 And finally in Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court upheld
a tax exemption for "real or personal property used exclusively for
75

See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
76366 U.S. at 422 (1961).
77Id. at 450.
78
1d. at 444-45, 453.
79374 U.S. at 205 (1963).
"Ild. at 205-07 (the law also provided that "[a]ny child shall be excused from such Bible
reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian.").
8
11d. at 223.
' 21d. at 222 (referring to Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1947); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. at 442 (1961)).
83392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
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religious, educational, or charitable purposes."84 Finding a secular
purpose for the exemption, 85 the Court added a layer to its effects
analysis by observing that it had to "be sure that the end result - the
effect - is not an excessive government entanglement with
religion." 86
Thus, the contours of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence ripened during the 1960s to move the Court away from
its quasi-strict separationist view of the wall of separation with
which it entered the decade.
The next stage in the evolution of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence unfolded in Lemon v. Kurtzman,87 a 1971 case that
cobbled together the various elements from McGowan, Allen,
Schempp, and Walz into one concise test for an Establishment Clause
violation. In Lemon, the Court examined the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that provided public money
to parochial schools. 88 Looking back at its decisions to that point,
the Court found that the constitutionality of a given legislative
enactment could be adjudged by three criteria: 89 "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 90 Applying the Lemon test, as it has
become known, the Court found no evidence that either
Pennsylvania or Rhode Island enacted its statute with the intent to
promote religion. 9' Indeed, the Court noted that each state enacted
statutory limitations to insulate the interaction between government
and religion in schools. 92 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
397 U.S. 664, 666-67 (1970).
1d. at 672 (the secular purpose was "moral or mental improvement").
86
d. at 674.
87403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971).
88
1d. at 606 (The Pennsylvania statute provided money to nonpublic schools by reimbursing
85

the schools for expenses associated with teachers' salaries and teaching materials, including
textbooks. Under the Rhode Island statute, the state made a supplemental payment of 15% of a
teacher's salary directly to teachers in nonpublic schools. Id. at 606-07.).
89
1d. at 612.
"Id. at 612-13 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) for the second prong
of the test).
91
' d. at 613 (The Court, in fact, found the opposite to be true and said that "the statutes
themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in
all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws.").
92

1d.
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"the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes in each State involve[d] excessive entanglement between
government and religion." 93 The Rhode Island statute distributed
public monies to schools that were run by sectarian individuals,
governed by rules akin to diocesan law, and utilized employment or
salary contracts signed or negotiated by a parish priest.9 4 While

Pennsylvania's statutory safeguard barred distributions for religious
instruction, 95 the Court similarly found that the statute fostered "an
96
intimate and continuing relationship between church and state."
The Court reasoned that Pennsylvania's statute allowed the
government "to inspect and evaluate a church-related school's
financial records to determine which expenditures [were]
religious. '9' Although neither state statute survived, the Lemon test
and its implementation in these cases represented the Court's most
definitive statement in its history regarding the scope of
Establishment Clause protection.
B. Lemon and Religious Symbols-the Evolution Continues
After Lemon synthesized existing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence into one framework, the Lemon test became the staple
98
by which to adjudge Establishment Clause violations.
93

1d. at 614 (The Court stated that it did not need to examine the effect prong of the Lemon
test because it found that the statutes violated the excessive entanglement aspect of the inquiry.
Id.at 613.).
94
1d. at 617-18 (despite these connections, the Court further stated that it did not:
assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious
design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the First Amendment. We
simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with
his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great
difficulty in remaining religiously neutral.
Id. at 618.).
95
1d. at 621 (stating that the exclusion barred money for "any subject matter expressing
religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect").
96
1d. at 622.
97
1d. at 621.
98
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (noting that in 31 cases involving the
Establishment Clause between 1971 and 1992, the Court utilized the Lemon test in 30 of those
cases. The only case where the Court did not use the Lemon test was Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 795 (1983), where the Court upheld Nebraska's practice of opening legislative sessions
with a prayer delivered by a chaplain on the state's payroll based upon the longstanding history
of the practice.).
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Nevertheless, the doctrine continued to evolve in cases dealing with
religious public displays, beginning with Lynch v. Donnelly.99 In
Lynch, the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a
Christmas display in a privately owned park located in the middle of
Pawtucket's shopping district.100 The Christmas display, owned and
maintained by the city, included decorations such as a creche,
reindeer, Santa's house, carolers, a clown, an elephant, a teddy bear,
Christmas lights, and a banner that read "SEASONS
GREETINGS."' 0 '
The creche itself consisted of figurines
representing Jesus, Mary, Joseph, kings, angels, shepherds, and
various animals.' 02 Although the display appeared like those "found
in hundreds of towns or cities across the Nation," the mere presence
of the creche in Pawtucket's display caused some citizens to mount
an Establishment Clause attack against the city.'0 3
Investigating the Establishment Clause claim, the Court began by
putting some real estate between itself and its quasi-strict
separationist view of the past. 104 The Court asserted that Jefferson's
wall of separation "is a useful figure of speech" but "not a wholly
accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in
fact exists between church and state." 10 5 Furthermore, the Court
downgraded the Lemon test's apparent universal applicability by
expressing an "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion" because "no fixed, per se rule" could be devised to cover
all Establishment Clause cases.' 0 6 Nevertheless, the Court had no
107
problem applying the Lemon test to the creche at issue in Lynch.
The Court decided that the inclusion of the creche in Pawtucket's
Christmas display satisfied the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test because Pawtucket erected the display "to celebrate the Holiday
and to depict the origins of that Holiday."'0 8 Furthermore, the Court
concluded that the creche's inclusion did not have the primary effect
99465 U.S. 668 (1984).
'Id. at 671.
101
1d
"21d. (the figures themselves stood anywhere from 5" to 5' in height).
103
1d
'041d. at 672-83.
"1d. at 673 (referring to Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
'°61d. at 678-79.
" 71d. at 681.
1O81d "
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of promoting or endorsing religion to any degree greater than past
practices upheld under the Establishment Clause such as using
public monies to transport children to private schools or tax
exemptions for church-owned property.' 0 9 Turning to Lemon's last
tier of analysis, the Court failed to find an excessive entanglement
between church and state with regard to the creche's display because
of the minimal value of the creche and the lack of contact between
the church and government regarding the content or design of the
display." 0 Thus, the Court satisfied itself that Lemon's requirements
had been fulfilled and upheld Pawtucket's use of a creche in its
Christmas display."'
The most noteworthy aspect of the Lynch decision appeared in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence with the majority decision to uphold
the constitutionality of the creche's inclusion in the display. 1 2 In
her concurrence, Justice O'Connor characterized the principal issue
in the case as whether the city endorsed Christianity by using the
creche in its Christmas display." 3 To answer this question, the
Court needed to determine not only what message the city intended
to send with its display, but also what message viewers actually

"Id

at 682 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968) (upholding the use of

public money for textbooks for children in private schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 679-80 (1970) (allowing tax exemptions for church properties); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (legislative prayer in Nebraska); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
689 (1971) (upholding the use of federal money for college buildings at church-related
institutions of higher education); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-67 (1961)
(affirming noncategorical grants to religious colleges); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
451-53 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952)
(release programs at public schools for religious instruction); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 18 (1947) (affirming the use of money for transporting children to private schools); see also
William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court; Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 Duke L. J. 770, 783 (1984) (dubbing the test used in
Lynch as the "any more than" test).
"°Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684. The opinion explains that:
[tihere is no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the content or
design of the exhibit prior to or since Pawtucket's purchase of the creche. No
expenditures for maintenance of the cr&che have been necessary; and since the city
owns the creche, now valued at $200, the tangible material it contributes is de minimis.
IIld. at 685.
. 2See id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 31d at 690.
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received from the display. 114 By synthesizing the inquiry in this
manner, Justice O'Connor combined Lemon's purpose and effect
prongs into one test that examined whether the government intended
to endorse religion from either an objective or subjective viewpoint,
the latter of which recognized that the message sent may be different
from the message received by the viewer.1 15 The "crucial"
component of this inquiry focused on whether governmental action,
intended or not, made "religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community."' 16 In other words,
an impermissible governmental endorsement of religion occurred
when government action conveyed a message "to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders,
'
favored members of the political community." 17
Applying this newly minted "endorsement" test, Justice
O'Connor concluded that Pawtucket did not objectively intend to
endorse religion." 8 For Justice O'Connor, the purpose of including
the creche was not to promote the religiosity of the creche but simply
to celebrate Christmas using a traditional symbol associated with the
holiday." 9 Furthermore, the creche itself did not "communicate a
message that the government intend[ed] to endorse the Christian
beliefs represented by the creche."' 120 The "overall holiday setting
change[d] what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of
the display" just like a museum environment dissociated the content
of a painting from endorsement of the message conveyed by that
content. 12' In Justice O'Connor's eyes, then, the display merely
celebrated a public holiday with significant22 secular aspects
irrespective of the sectarian nature of the creche.1

4

1d.
151d (stating that "[t]he meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the intention
of the speaker and on the 'objective' meaning of the statement in the community").
16
1d. at 692.
"Ild. at 688.
"Id. at 693.
"91d. at 691. Justice O'Connor also stated her belief that the city did not intend to favor
religion over non-religion. Id.
1201d. at 692.
1

1211d
1221d
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Five years later, the Court signaled its assent to Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test in another important case involving
religious symbols, County ofAllegheny v. ACLU of Pittsburgh.123 In
Allegheny, two holiday displays that included religious symbols
came under Establishment Clause fire. 124 The first display involved
a Roman Catholic group's placement of a creche on the "Grand
Staircase" within the county courthouse during the Christmas season
with the permission of the county. 125 A wooden fence enclosed the
creche on three sides while red and white poinsettia plants and an
evergreen tree adorned the fence itself.126 Furthermore, a plaque
reading "This Display Donated by the Holy Name Society" was
affixed to the fence.' 27
The second display combined a
forty-five-foot Christmas tree, a sign at the foot of the Christmas tree
entitled "Salute to Liberty," and an eighteen-foot Chanukah menorah
at the entrance to the City-County Building located one block from
the courthouse and its display. 128 Although owned by a religious
group, the City of Pittsburgh stored, placed, and removed the
menorah on an annual basis. 29 Like Lynch, then, the inclusion of
religious symbols in holiday displays appeared to place church and
state in an uncomfortably close relationship for Establishment
Clause purposes.
After traversing the Court's past Establishment Clause doctrine,
including Lynch, 30 Justice Blackmun embraced the endorsement test
because it not only rejected the idea that the Court would accept
some governmental endorsement of religion, but also provided an

123492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
1241d. at 579-87.
1251d. at 579-81 (explaining that the Holy Name Society placed the creche on the "Grand
Staircase," which was described as the "most beautiful" and "most public" part of the courthouse.
The county used the creche and the staircase itself in its annual Christmas caroling celebration).
1261d. at 580.
27

1 1d.

128Id. at 581-87. The sign read "During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes
liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our
legacy of freedom." Id. at 582.
12910. at 587.
"'Id. at 594 (maintaining that the Lynch decision was "none too clear.") Lynch contained
two lines of thought, the "any more than" rationale and the incidental benefits theory, both of
which failed to provide sufficient guidance for future decisions.
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analytical tool to determine when such endorsement occurred.' 3 '
Utilizing the endorsement test, Justice Blackmun's opinion
examined the setting in which individuals viewed the creche on the
staircase within the courthouse. 132 Justice Blackmun noted that,
unlike the elephants, clowns, and reindeer that surrounded that
creche in Lynch, nothing in the display of the creche on the Grand
Staircase muted its religious message.' 33 The flowers on the fence of
the Grand Staircase display did not detract from the religious
message but rather drew attention to and actually enhanced the
creche's religious message.' 34 Furthermore, the location of the
display on the Grand Staircase at the seat of government suggested
an impermissible governmental endorsement of a religious message
because "[n]o viewer could reasonably think that it occupie[d] this
location without the support and approval of the government." 1' TO
that end, the sign designating a Roman Catholic organization as the
owner of the creche failed to prevent governmental endorsement of
the message conveyed by the creche in the display. 36 Instead, the
presence of the sign simply showed that the government lent its
support to the Roman Catholic message even though the government
itself did not sponsor the message. 37 In the end, the Court
permanently enjoined the display of the creche
on the staircase in the
38
county courthouse in a close 5-4 decision.'
If the constitutionality of the creche placed an easy question
before it, the Court faced a "closer constitutional question" when
examining the display involving the menorah at the City-County
Building. 39 Although Justice Blackmun characterized the menorah
as a religious symbol, the menorah represented a holiday with both
sectarian and secular aspects. 4 ° Moreover, the placement of the
3

'Id.at 595 (referring to the notion that impermissible government messages convey to some
that they are outsiders and to others that they are insiders).
32
1d. at 597.
13 3
1d. at 598 (stating that the creche is "capable of communicating a religious message" and
that "the creche stands alone: it is the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase").
34
1 1d at 599.
35
1 1d. at 599-600.
36

' 1d. at 600-01.
1371d

1381d. at 602.
'"Id.at 613.
40
Id. at 613-14 (noting that the religious component of the menorah's message
commemorated "the miracle of the oil as described in the Talmud.").

2003]

EQUAL ACCESS AND THE PUBLICFORUM

191

menorah next to the Christmas tree symbolized two faith
traditions-one Jewish and one Christian-instead of just one like
the creche on the staircase. 14 1 In that light, the question became
whether Pittsburgh's display of these symbols represented an
impermissible endorsement of both Jewish and Christian faith
traditions or recognized each as part of a traditional secular holiday
celebration. 142 Answering this question, Justice Blackmun argued
that the Christmas tree, a secular symbol, dominated the city's
display in front of the City-County Building; therefore, pairing the
menorah with the larger tree conveyed a message to the observer that
the city recognized more than one manner of celebrating the
Christmas holiday.143 In other words, the combination of the tree
and menorah signified "a secular celebration of Christmas coupled
with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous
alternative tradition" and not an impermissible dual endorsement of
the Jewish and Christian faiths. 144 In addition, the "Salute to
Liberty" sign at the foot of the tree confirmed that the display served
145
to recognize cultural diversity and not to endorse the Jewish faith.
As a result, the menorah's display did not present a "sufficiently
likely" probability that observers would understand it as
disapproving of their religious choices thereby relegating them to the
status of political outsiders in their communities. 46 Thus, the
display of the menorah did not violate
the endorsement test in the
1 47
minds of six members of the Court.
Although five members of the Court embraced the endorsement
test in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy's opinion stood out for its
criticism of the majority's acceptance of the endorsement test into
41

1 1d. at 614-15.
142

1d. at 614-16 (commenting that it would discriminate against Jews to allow Pittsburgh to

celebrate Christmas based upon cultural tradition but not Chanukah).
43
1d. at 616-17 (noting that the Christmas tree was once a sectarian symbol but that it has
lost its religious overtones).
'41d. at 617-18 (asserting that there were no suitable substitutes for the menorah-"an
18-foot dreidel would look out of place and might be interpreted by some as mocking the
celebration of Chanukah.").
141d at 619.
1461d, at 620.
147Id. at 620-21.
Justice Blackmun, however, did observe that this conclusion did not
preclude a finding that the display of the menorah violated the purpose or entanglement prongs of
the Lemon test, which were issues that the lower court did not address. Id.
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 148 In fact, Justice Kennedy
declared the endorsement test to be "flawed in its fundamentals and
unworkable in practice. ,149 If the Court applied the endorsement test
without regard to historical practice, the Court would strike down
scores of governmental practices upheld against previous
Establishment Clause challenges, such as Thanksgiving Day
5°
proclamations and various portions of the United States Code.
According to Justice Kennedy, utilizing the endorsement test in the
absence of historical or precedential references equated to a
"jurisprudence of minutiae" that required courts to "consider
whether the city has included Santas, talking wishing wells, reindeer,
or other secular symbols" to draw attention away from the religious
symbol in the same display. 5 ' Engaging in this examination of
"minutiae" involved, for example, calculating the secular symbols'
distance from the sectarian symbol, the "prominence" of the
display's location, and gauging the insulating effect of the secular
symbols on the sectarian symbol. 15 2 Given all of its shortcomings,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the endorsement test "could provide
workable guidance to the lower courts, if ever, only after this Court
has decided a long series of holiday display cases, using little more
than intuition and a tape measure."' 5 3 For now, the endorsement test
represented a "most unwelcome 5 4 addition to our tangled
Establishment Clause jurisprudence."
Refusing to apply the majority's endorsement test, Justice
Kennedy unveiled a new standard by which to analyze
Establishment Clause issues.
For Justice Kennedy, the
Establishment Clause simply required that the government remain
neutral toward religion.' 55 As a result, government practices that
merely accommodated, acknowledged, or offered support for
48

1 1d. at

668.

1491d. at 669.
5
' Id. at 670-72 (containing numerous examples of permissible practices that would be
impermissible under the majority's endorsement test).
5
Id. at 674.
2
1d at 674-75 (humorously noting that "municipal greenery must be used with care.").
.53Id. at 675.
"'Id at 668. For a more complete elucidation of Justice Kennedy's coercion test, see Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-11 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
580-99 (1992).
55
' County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 656-58.
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religion were perfectly acceptable in light of "our political and
cultural heritage" as well as past cases before the Court.'56 To that
end, Justice Kennedy opined that the majority misunderstood Lynch
because that decision did not hinge on that creche being surrounded
'1 57
by "candy canes, reindeer, and other holiday paraphernalia."
Instead, the traditional holiday season in general served as the
appropriate context for these symbols,' 58 and the holidays as a whole
have been traditionally acknowledged by governmental bodies.
According to Justice Kennedy, the border between permissible
acknowledgement and impermissible endorsement must be jealously
guarded because government may permissibly acknowledge
religion. 59 To that end, a review of past cases revealed two
principles that served to create the barrier between acknowledgement
and endorsement-"govermment may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not ... give

direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes
a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."" ' 6 Applying
this "coercion" test, Justice Kennedy found no evidence to suggest
"that the government's power to coerce has been used to further the
interests of Christianity or Judaism in any way." 161 As a result,
neither the creche nor the menorah posed a "realistic risk" of
creating an establishment of religion.' 62 With regard to the banning
of the creche based upon the imprecise endorsement test, Justice
Kennedy asserted that the majority's decision reflected "an
unjustified hostility toward religion" and a "callous indifference
'
toward religious faith that our cases and traditions do not require. "163
56

1d. at 657-58 (citing the accommodation in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14

(1952)). see generally Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Justice Kennedy further argued that adhering to the principal effect
of promotion test "would require a relentless extirpation of all contact between the government
and religion." County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 657.
"'7 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 665-666 (arguing that "[n]othing in Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court in Lynch provides support for these distinctions" and also
asserting that the location of the symbols on public property was irrelevant to the analysis).
l'ld at 665.
159Id. at 659.
' 601d. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
1611d. at 664.
1621d
5
1631d. at 655,664.
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Responding to Justice Kennedy's assault on the endorsement test,
Justice O'Connor took the opportunity to answer the criticisms in
her concurrence with the majority result. 164 Rather than ignoring
history and precedent as Justice Kennedy asserted, the endorsement
test accounted for both as "part of the context in which a reasonable
observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice
conveys a message of endorsement of religion." 165 Despite its fact
intensive inquiry, Justice O'Connor maintained that the endorsement
test reflected the essential protection guaranteed by the
Establishment Clause that government is prohibited from making
166
religion relevant to one's political standing in the community.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor contended that the Court had yet to
develop a superior test to determine the existence of Establishment
Clause violations. 167 The coercion test, in Justice O'Connor's
opinion, failed to protect a citizen's religious liberty or respect the
religious pluralism of the nation. 168 In fact, the Court had
recognized the inadequate protection offered by a coercion standard
by itself in prior cases; therefore, the Court never relied on coercion,
whether indirect or direct, as the sole benchmark for Establishment
Clause violations.' 69 Justice O'Connor asserted that to require
coercion of any nature to be "an essential element of an
Establishment Clause violation would make the Free Exercise
Clause a redundancy."' 170 In short, the endorsement test best
'Ild.
at 622-37 (Justice O'Connor concurred in the result but differed with the reasoning set
forth by Justice Blackmun's majority opinion with regard to the menorah. According to Justice
O'Connor, the secular dimensions of the menorah did not have to be examined to determine that
the display failed to endorse Judaism or religion in general. Id. at 633-37. The theme of the
display simply involved liberty and pluralism as indicated by the sign, the tree, and the inclusion
of the religious symbol. Id. at 634. Furthermore, the menorah did not endorse religion in
comparison to nonreligion. Id. at 635. The display acknowledged a holiday celebrated by both
religious and nonreligious people.).
16
Id.at 630-31. For example, the longstanding nature of practices like legislative prayer led
to the conclusion that such acts did not violate the Establishment Clause despite their religious

ties.

66

1 Id.at 627-28.
167

1d. at 631.
' 681d. at 627-28.
69
1d. at 628 (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786
(1973)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
17
°1d. (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)); Douglas Laycock,
"Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About OriginalIntent, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV.875, 922 (1986).
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captured the notion that religious liberty is most protected when
government is barred from favoring one set of religious tenets over
those of a different religious faith.' 7

III. THE LINK BETWEEN ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE SPEECH
For the present time, the endorsement test has triumphed over
both theoretical competitors 7 2 and derisive detractors' 73 to become
the preeminent analytical tool employed in Establishment Clause
cases involving religious symbols.' 74 Most recently, however,
non-holiday displays on public grounds that include religious
symbols present a unique constitutional challenge to the applicability
of the endorsement test. Cognizant of the endorsement test and
trying to get around it, these displays frequently combine the Ten
Commandments and other historical documents such as the
Declaration of Independence or the Bill or Rights on a single, stone
75
monument. Ignoring the obvious religiosity of the Decalogue,'
advocates of the displays insist that the inclusion of the Ten
Commandments does nothing more than avert today's "moral
meltdown" by reminding viewers of the moral principles that played
an important role in the historical development of this nation's
law. 176 Apparently of a like mind, a number of state capitals and
7

See id. at 631.

172See, e.g., supra notes 155-163 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy's
coercion test).
73
1 See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "[i]t would be appalling... [to have] witnesses testifying that they
were offended-but would have been less so were the creche five feet closer to the jumbo candy
cane"); ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569 (6th Cir. 1986) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (calling the endorsement test the "St. Nicholas too" test); Nancy Dunne, Putting
Christ Back into Christ-mas, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 21, 1984, at 14, available at LEXIS,

News Library (referring to the "two plastic reindeer rule").
74
' See, e.g., Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 306 (7th Cir. 2000); Murray v. City of
Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 153-58 (5th Cir. 1991); Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485,
1491 (10th Cir. 1989); see also Steven C. Gey, When Is Religious Speech Not "FreeSpeech"?,

2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 379, 444 (2000) (stating that the endorsement test "commands" the support
of the Court).
of a majority
175Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) ("The Ten Commandments are undeniably a
sacred76text in the Jewish and Christian faiths ....).
1 Carolyn

Bower, Parents, Students Debate Posting Commandments, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, June 20, 1999, at C3, available at LEXIS, News Library (stating that we live in

an amoral society and the Commandments provide standards to guide lives); see also David
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courthouses already openly display the Ten Commandments on their
lawns or within the buildings themselves.' 77 Because these
monuments are stationed on public property, a different variable is
placed under the endorsement microscope that is less overt and of
much greater constitutional import when compared to those
generally discussed in the holiday display cases-the constitutional
right to free speech based upon the physical location of the display.
Like every other constitutional protection, the Establishment
Clause does not exist in a vacuum but instead coexists with other
constitutional mandates, especially its First Amendment sibling-the
Free Speech Clause.
The Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment
mandates
that "Congress
shall make
no
law... abridging the freedom of speech."' 78 At its heart, the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects "the free flow 1 of
79
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern"
because "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
Waters, Freedom of Which Religion in Particular?,THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Jan.
26, 2000, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library (describing a rally in support of the Ten
Commandments for "decent, morally minded individuals"); John Rivera, ChristiansPushing to
"Hang Ten, " DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Feb. 26, 2000, at El, available at LEXIS,
News Library (noting the statement of Janet Parshall, spokeswoman for the Family Research
Council, that the Ten Commandments constitute a "moral code of behavior"); Robert Parham,
Ten Commandments and a Number of Views; To Many, America 's Cultural War over the
Separation of Church and State Comes down to the Display of 10 Mandates, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Apr. 2, 2000, at G1, available at LEXIS, News Library (quoting a member of
Congress from Alabama saying that posting the Ten Commandments is "one step that states can
take to promote morality").
...
See supra note 44 (providing a brief list of the litigation involving the appearance of
religious symbols on government property); see also Joan Lowy, Religion, Morality Gain More
Attention in State Legislatures; Critics Say Posting Ten Commandments, Other Measures Aren 't
Cure for Societal Ills, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at 21 A, available at LEXIS,
News Library (providing a list of legislative actions taken in a number of states that seek to allow
the posting of the Ten Commandments on public property); Robert Parham, Ten Commandments
and a Number of Views; to Many, America's Cultural War over the Separation of Church and
State Comes down to Display of 10 Mandates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 2, 2000, at G1,
available at LEXIS, News Library (recalling that the House of Representatives passed a measure
that allowed the Ten Commandments to be displayed in courthouses and other public buildings
but that the bill never passed the Senate). For a discussion of the House's legislative action in
general, see Joel L. Thollander, Thou Shall Not Challenge the Court? The Ten Commandments
Defense Act as a Legislative Invitationfor Judicial Reconsideration,4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 205, 210-25 (2000/2001).
78U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

179Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
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accepted in the competition of the market."' 180 Although the tenet
freely admits ideas into the marketplace, one cannot convey
whatever message one wants whenever or wherever one wants on
public property. 181 Governmental regulatory power frequently
extends to the places, times, and ways of communication available to
private speakers on public property.' 82 Because the opinions of the
elected generally reflect those of the majority to be elected in the
first place, the exercise of regulatory power by the elected threatens
to banish minority or unpopular opinions from public discourse even
before they enter the public arena.' 83 Thus, a constant tension exists
between the free entry of ideas into the marketplace for public
inspection and the regulation of private speakers on public
land
84
attempting to propel their ideas into that same marketplace.'
To assess the relationship between governmental ability to
regulate speech on public property, the Court succinctly delineated
what is known as its forum analysis in Perry Education Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 185 Speakers have the greatest
communicative freedom in traditional public forums, which are
defined as public areas that "have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
'Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (explaining why
a state is barred from restricting free speech). For other values encouraged by the protection of
free speech, see, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438
(1983) (free speech promotes the well-being of society and government); Martin H. Redish, The
Value of FreeSpeech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593 (1982) (free speech nurtures self-realization).
8
'Of course, government may speak on its own behalf. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) (observing that the government may speak in a non-neutral fashion).
82
1 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (describing reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions that can be constitutionally implemented by government when regulating
speech on public property).
183First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) (arguing that a First Amendment
violation occurs when legislatures skew public debate by favoring one opinion over another).
18
aNiemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273-74 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating
that government has long "grappled with the claims of the right to disseminate ideas in public
places as against claims of an effective power in government to keep the peace and to protect
other interests of a civilized community").
185460 U.S. 37, 45-50 (1983). For a history of the public forum doctrine, see generally
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
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and discussing public questions."'1 86 Despite the latitude given to
speakers in traditional public forums, government may enforce a
content-based exclusion if such is "necessary to serve a compelling
'
state interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve that end."187
In
addition, the government may also enforce "time, place, and
manner" restrictions on speech in traditional public forums provided
they are "content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication." 188 To take but one example of what constitutes a
traditional public forum, the Court struck down a restriction on
picketing on public streets in Carey v. Brown because public streets
189
have traditionally been used as gathering places for public debate.
In short, the ability of the government to restrict communicative
activity in public places that have been historically utilized for such
activity is "sharply circumscribed." 1' 9'
In contrast to the protection afforded speakers in traditional
public forums, Perry instructed that the government may exert
greater control over communicative activity in "designated public
forums" and "nonpublic forums." A "designated public forum" is a
piece of public property that the government opens to the public for
the purpose of expressive activity even though the property is not
traditionally used for communicative purposes, 191 such as state
university meeting rooms1 92 or theaters.' 93 Once opened for
expressive activity, the government must apply the same rules that
curtail its regulatory ability over speech in the traditional public
forums to the designated forum during the period that the designated
forum remains available to the public. So, for example, permissible
governmental regulations limiting the use of a designated public
186Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
187 d.(citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
88
' 1d. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981)); see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36
(1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
189447 U.S. at 460 (1980).
'90Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
1911d
19 2
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a state university could not
exclude a religious student group from access to university facilities after making such facilities
available for student groups in general).
93
1 S.E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975).
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94
forum include reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.'
Similarly, the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations on speech activity in nonpublic forums, which
are those public properties not traditionally used for expressive
activity or designated for public communication. 95 In addition, the
government "may reserve the [nonpublic] forum for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 196 Indeed,
Perry itself involved the Court's determination that a public school's
internal mail system constituted a nonpublic forum because the
system was not generally available for public usage.' 97 In sum, the
Court ratchets up the ability of the government to restrict speech as it
moves up the pyramid of forum analysis from the traditional public
forum to the nonpublic forum.
Within the context of Establishment Clause challenges to holiday
displays, the importance of the forum lurked in the shadows of Santa
and candy canes in the endorsement calculus without regard to its
constitutional ramifications. Though not directly addressed in
Lynch, the Court noted at the outset of its opinion that the creche at
issue was located in a private park like others located in public parks
throughout the country. This fact became more visible as the
endorsement test matured in holiday display cases. For example,
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Allegheny argued that "[n]o
viewer could reasonably think that it [(the creche)] occupies this
location [(on the Grand Staircase)] without the support and approval
of the government."' 98 Moreover, the Grand Staircase did not
"appear to be the kind of location in which all were free to place
their displays for weeks at a time, so that the presence of the creche

194Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (stating that "[alithough a State is not required to indefinitely retain
the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply

in a traditional public forum").
195Id.
1961d. (referring to United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
1"Id. (reaching this conclusion despite the access to the mail system possessed by non-school
groups like the Cub Scouts). However, the Court found that other groups that had access to the
mail system were similar in character to school groups. This was unlike the nature of the
plaintiffs in the case who were concerned with the interests of teachers. Id.at 48.
98
1 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1984).
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in that location for over six weeks would then not serve to associate
the government with the cr~che."' 99 Reading between the lines, the
Grand Staircase in the courthouse failed to qualify as a traditional
public forum because it did not have a recognized history or tradition
of allowing unfettered communicative activity. Indeed, Justice
Blackmun explicitly stated as much by noting that "the creche here
does not raise the kind of 'public forum' issue" faced by the Court in
past cases because the Grand Staircase was not denominated as a
public forum. z° Even Justice Kennedy tangentially commented on
Allegheny's forum in his criticism of the majority's analysis by
opining that Court precedent cannot be understood to mean that "the
use of public property necessarily converts otherwise permissible
20 1
government conduct into an Establishment Clause violation."
Thus, the emphasis placed upon the physical components in the
holiday display cases buried any underlying concern with free
speech rights in a given forum.
However, as the volume of Establishment Clause cases expanded,
the characterization of the forum assumed an increasingly prominent
position in the analysis. In Kreisner v. City of San Diego, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the display of eight Biblical scenes of the life of Jesus
in a public park during the Christmas season. 2 2 Pivotal to its
decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that the park was a traditional
public forum and the city had not denied anyone access to the park
for purposes of communicative activity.20 3 Following suit, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the display of sixteen paintings that
attempted to "put Christ back into Christmas' 20 4 because they were
located in "a quintessential public forum well removed from the seat
of the City government"
and "public forums must be open to

99

' 1d. at 600 n.50.
°°Id. (referring to McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1984), where a nativity

2

scene20 in a public park raised a public forum issue).
1d. at 667.
2021 F.3d 775, 776-79 (9th Cir. 1993).
20 3
1d. at 785-86 (noting that the park was not a designated public forum); see also McCreary
v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding the display of a creche in a traditional
public forum during the holidays), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub noma.Bd. of Trs. v.
McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
2
"Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 612 (7th Cir. 1992).
205
d. at 613.
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religious speech., 20 6 On the other hand, the Second Circuit
dismissed an argument that the sponsor of a menorah in a public
park had a right to use the public forum for expressive conduct and
reversed a lower court ruling that upheld the display against an
Establishment Clause challenge. 20 7 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit
prohibited the display of a stand-alone creche on the front lawn of
the County Office Building and cast aside the free speech concerns
associated with that traditional public forum. 20 8 Thus, courts took
divergent views of the importance of free speech in the public forum
when examining religious displays on public property to determine
whether such violate the Establishment Clause.
Recognizing the obvious disagreement among the circuit courts in
these cases and realizing that the issue touched upon the fundamental
relationship between the Establishment and Free Speech Clauses, the
Supreme Court took its turn at the microphone in Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.20 9 In Pinette, the Ku Klux
Klan (KKK) petitioned the Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board (Board) for permission to erect a Latin cross on Capitol
Square (Square), a ten-acre park surrounding the Ohio state capitol
building. 210 Prior to receiving the KKK's application, the Board
granted permission to place unattended displays of both a Christmas
tree and a menorah on the Square.21 ' Despite having no policy
against allowing unattended displays and granting the two prior
applications, the Board denied the KKK's request to place its cross

26

1d. at 619;

see also Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1395 (11th Cir. 1993)

(upholding a menorah's display in a public forum).
... Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (2d Cir. 1989) (relying on County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989) and noting that the menorah stood by itself on
government property and that no viewer could think that it occupied its position without
government approval).
20
Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 958-60 (4th Cir. 1990).
209515 U.S. 753, 759 (1995) (justifying the grant of certiorari on the basis of the split of
opinion on the issue between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits versus the Second and Fourth
Circuits). The latter two circuits, as previously described, generally prohibited displays
regardless of the forum's traditional role as a center for expressive conduct.
21
°Id. at 757-58. Pinette, by the way, was the leader of the Ohio KKK at the time. Id. at 758.
Furthermore, Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-4-02(A) (1994) made the Square available for
public debate. Id. at 757-58.
21
ld. at 758 (noting that the KKK sought permission to erect its cross after the Board granted
permission to put a Christmas tree and a menorah on the square).
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on the Square during the 1993 holiday season. 2 12 The KKK found
no relief through its
213 administrative appeals, so it sought to enjoin the
Board's decision.

Finding a receptive audience in the Southern

District of Ohio, the KKK won an injunction against the Board's
decision and planted its cross on the Square.2 14 The Sixth Circuit
subsequently affirmed the district court and the Board appealed to
the Supreme Court.215
Writing for a plurality in Pinette, Justice Scalia first pointed out
that the issue before the Court was simply whether a private,
unattended display of a religious symbol in a public forum violated
the Establishment Clause and not one involving discrimination based
on the KKK's message. 216 To that end, the Court found that the
KKK's cross constituted private religious speech entitled to the full
protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.217
However, the Court also noted that the protection offered by the First
Amendment did not guarantee that speakers could convey their
messages on all government owned property because of the Court's
forum analysis. 218 Referring to Perry, the Court reiterated that the
state could enact content-neutral reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions in general, but if it wanted to regulate the content of
messages, such regulations had to be "necessary, and narrowly
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest., 219 In this case, the
Board admitted that it denied the KKK's petition because of its
religious message. 220 As a result, the Board argued that it sought to
2 12

1d. (explaining that the Board informed the KKK by letter that their denial "was made

upon the advice of counsel, in a good faith attempt to comply with the Ohio and United States
Constitutions, as they have been interpreted in relevant decisions by the Federal and State

Courts.").
2 13

1d. at 758-59.
1d. at 759.
5
Id.(referring to 30 F.3d 675, 676 (1994)).
6
d. at 759-60 (noting the KKK's assertion that the Board denied their petition because it

2 14
2
2

disagreed with their political viewpoint, but the lower courts did not address that issue so the
Court refused to address it). The petition itself only required that a group meet various safety,
sanitation, and noninterference requirements. Id. at 757-58.
2 17
1d. at 760 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
394-95 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-49 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 277-78 (1981); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,

647 (1981)).
2 18

1d. at 761.
1d. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
220Id
2 19
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avoid an Establishment Clause violation by granting permission to
erect the cross thereby giving the appearance that the government
endorsed Christianity. 22 ' Thus, the resolution of the case boiled
down to whether the Board's decision was necessary and narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
Undertaking to resolve the issue, the Court opined that avoiding
an Establishment Clause violation constituted a sufficiently
compelling interest to regulate speech based on content.222 The
fundamental question presented here, according to Justice Scalia,
was whether or not an Establishment Clause violation existed in
light of two previous cases encompassing similar issues-Widmar v.
Vincent and Lamb 's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District.223 In both Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, the Court deemed
school policies that barred religious uses of facilities generally
available for non-religious uses to be violations of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.224 Although the schools argued that
their exclusions avoided Establishment Clause violations, the Court
retorted that the schools opened their forums to a range of expressive
conduct and that "an open forum... does not confer any imprimatur
of state approval on religious sects or practices. ' '225 Moreover, the
Court characterized any benefit inuring to religion by using the
school facilities/open forums as being "incidental. 226 As a result,
neither of the cases raised Establishment Clause concerns.
Seeing the obvious need to distinguish Widmar and Lamb's
Chapel, the Board asserted that the location of the public forum next
to the "seat of government" gave the appearance that government
endorsed the message of the KKK's cross; therefore, the presence 227
of
the cross within the public forum violated the endorsement test.
However, the plurality deemed the endorsement test irrelevant
because of the "crucial difference between government speech
221

1d.

22

RId. at 761-62.
223
1 1d. at 762 (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993);

Widmar, 454 U.S. 263,

271 (1981)).
224

225
2 26

1d
1d at 763 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at

274).

at 762-63 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395) (stating
that "aniy benefit to religion or the Church would have been no more than incidental").
2 27
1d. at 763 (noting that the state of Ohio, like the schools in Widmar and Lamb 's Chapel,
created an open forum on public property).
1d
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endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect." 228 Justice Scalia wrote that accepting the
Board's argument would be equivalent to accepting the notion that
endorsement could be transferred from a private speaker in an open
forum to the government on the basis of observer error.229 Even
though mistakes may occur, "erroneous conclusions do not count"
where the forum is open and the display is privately sponsored.23 °
Simply put, the plurality refused to recognize a "transferred
endorsement" test.231 In fact, the plurality asserted that the
endorsement test only applied in cases where the government either
conveyed a religious message or adhered to a policy that
discriminated in favor of private religious messages.2 32 Here, the
government neither "fostered" the mistake by speaking in its own
right nor "encouraged" the mistake by favoring some messages over
others.233
If courts recognized a transferred endorsement test,
government would have to weigh a "host of imponderables" when
trying to balance the free exercise rights of citizens with the
avoidance of an establishment with litigation being the penalty for an
incorrect balance.234 Ultimately, the plurality held that "[r]eligious
expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is
purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public
forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms. 23 5
Although Justice Scalia's opinion only earned the support of a
plurality of the Court, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter
wrote concurrences with the judgment that were joined by two other
members of the Court thereby making the judgment a majority
decision. Justice O'Connor wrote to fend off yet another attack to
228

1d. at 765 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)) (alteration in
original).
229
1d. at 766.
230
1d. at 765.
23 1
1d. at 767.
232
1d. at 764-65 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685-87 (1984); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 and n.50 (1989); Bd. of Educ. v. Grument 512 U.S.
687, 708-10 (1994)).
233
1d. at 766.
234
1d. at 768 (noting that the "imponderables" included "[h]ow close to government is too
close? What kind of building, and in what context, symbolizes state authority?"). The litigation
would be for violating either the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses. Id.
235
1d. at 770.
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the endorsement test in the form of Justice Scalia's "exception to the
endorsement test for the public forum context., 236 Unlike the
plurality opinion that confined the endorsement test to cases of direct
governmental involvement or favoritism, Justice O'Connor argued
that a violation of the Establishment Clause could occur in a number
of contexts outside of the two set forth by the plurality.237 To that
end, the plurality opinion took an "exceedingly narrow view of the
Establishment Clause" by failing to recognize that the Establishment
Clause barred a government from insulating itself from the effects of
its acts under the guise of formally neutral policies.238 In the public
forum context, like the one here, the basic test for an Establishment
Clause violation remained whether or not the government's
maintenance of the public forum had the effect of conveying a
message endorsing religion even if the government did not intend or
encourage that result. 239 An Establishment Clause violation, in this
context, is not based upon some notion of transferring endorsement,
but simply on the idea that "the State's own actions... and their
relationship to the private speech at issue, actually convey a message
of endorsement., 240 Applying the endorsement test to Pinette's
facts, Justice O'Connor noted that many of the factors found
significant by the plurality would also be relevant to the endorsement
test in this context-lack of governmental involvement, use of a
public forum, and the private sponsorship of the cross.24 1 So instead
of relegating the endorsement test to the backseat when private
speech occurs in a public forum, Justice O'Connor found that the
endorsement test actually yielded the same end result in this case.24 2
Following Justice O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Souter penned
another criticism of the plurality's creation of a per se exception to
2161d. at 772 (O'Connor, J., joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
23
1'd. at 774 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I believe
that an impermissible message of endorsement can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of
which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism.").
238
Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
23

91d

"

24

°Id. (observing that the state's actions amounted to "operating the forum in a particular
manner and permitting the religious expression to take place therein") (alteration in original).
24 1
1d. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
242
1d. ("None of this is to suggest that I would be likely to come to a different result from the
plurality where truly private speech is allowed on equal terms in a vigorous public forum that the
government has administered properly.").
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the endorsement test for the public forum context.243 According to
Justice Souter, the plurality's limitation of the endorsement test
244
failed to have any foundation in the Court's jurisprudence.
Contrary to the plurality opinion, cases like Widmar and Lamb's
Chapel confirmed that the Court takes the nature and effect of the
forum into account as part of the endorsement test's contextual
investigation, rather than excluding it if the forum happens to be
characterized as open.2 45 In both of those cases, the Court examined
specific facts regarding private speech in a public forum including
whether other groups possessed equal access to the forum and
whether there was governmental association with the messages of
the speakers using the open forum.2 4 6 As a result, Justice Souter
argued in favor of applying the endorsement test in the public forum
context because "it is reasonable for an observer to attribute the
speech.., to the speaker, while an unattended display (and any
message it conveys) can naturally be viewed as belonging to the
owner of the land on which it stands."247 Here, Justice Souter
characterized the Board's concern about violating the Establishment
Clause by allowing the KKK to place its cross on the Square as
"understandabl[e] ."248
Nonetheless, the Board's denial of the
KKK"s application failed to be "narrowly drawn" because at least
two alternatives existed. 249 The Board could have either required
that an adequate disclaimer be affixed to the cross, or designated an
area for unattended displays accompanied by a disclaimer
dissociating the state from the messages.
In light of the Board's
failure to pursue such alternatives, Justice Souter ultimately agreed
with the plurality that the Board's decision misconstrued the line
between free speech and establishment. 1

43
2 1d

at 783-84 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (Justices
O'Connor and Breyer joining this concurrence).
2
4Id
(calling the exception "out of square with our precedents").
2 45
1d at 788-91 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

2ld.at 790-91 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
247

1d. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
1d. at 793 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
249
1d. at 793 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Perry
Educ.25 Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
Id.at 793-94 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
251
1d. at 794 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
24 8
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IV. RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS, NEUTRALITY, AND RESTRICTING FREE
SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC FORUM

As its jurisprudential history and multiplicity of analyses prove,
Establishment Clause questions are among the most difficult to
answer, particularly when the issue involves the use of religious
symbols. Indeed, the time-honored adage that "hard cases make bad
law" is strikingly 6 propos when referring to the jungle of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that has grown up around the
relationship between government and religious displays. Cases like
Pinette prove even more nettlesome because they not only involve
the Establishment Clause and its chaos theory, but also force the
Court to walk a constitutional high wire that balances the competing
interest of free speech. Recognizing that any decision rendered
under such circumstances would appear to diminish the
constitutional protection of either the Establishment or Free Speech
Clauses, Pinette avoided the intra-First Amendment clash altogether
by asserting that no such confrontation existed. The public forum
for the KKK's speech vanquished any issue arising from
Establishment Clause concerns because other speakers remained free
to construct displays of their own on the Square without
governmental interference. From the plurality's view, then, Pinette
did not weaken the guarantee of the Establishment Clause but rather
offered full protection for the messages conveyed by speakers
pursuant to neutral governmental policies.
Given its protection of free speech, Pinette flashes a green light to
groups seeking to post symbols in public forums. Because public
areas surrounding courthouses and the grounds of state capitols are
characterized as public forums for relatively unfettered expressive
conduct, 5 2 politically active leaders of religious groups advocate
252

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965); see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 313 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("More recently, the Court has added state capitol
grounds to the list of public forums compatible with free speech, free assembly, and the freedom
to petition for redress of grievances."); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963)
(stating that the grounds of the statehouse are appropriate for protest because they receive the
protection of a public forum); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1963) (explaining that state
capitol grounds were open for public use to express dissent with legislative decisions);
Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993) (characterizing the rotunda of
the Georgia Statehouse as a designated public forum, which provides the speaker the protection
associated with a traditional public forum). But see State v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737, 749 (Conn.
1995) (finding that legislative halls are nonpublic forums).
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posting religious items like the Ten Commandments in these forums
as a way to bring what they view as morality back into everyday
life.2 53 For example, a movement sponsored by the Family Research
Council known as "Hang Ten" actively supports the placement of
monuments containing the Ten Commandments on public property
throughout the nation.254 Notably, "Hang Ten" and similar groups in
favor of religious displays generally do not advocate posting the Ten
Commandments or other religious symbols on privately owned
billboards near roadways or in the front yards of those wishing to
promote the message. If they did, ironically, more observers would
likely see the messages. Instead, advocates of these displays
recognize the high probability for mistaken transference and push for
new displays at the seat of government to take advantage of the
speech amplification available in that location. 255 Furthermore,
"Hang Ten" vociferously argues in favor of the constitutionality of
the thousands of Ten Commandments monuments currently residing
on public property.256 Seizing on Pinette for ammunition, defenders
253

See supra note 176.
Terry Home, Commandments Display ChallengedAgain; ICLU Files Lawsuit, The Third
Such in Indiana, in Washington County on Behalf of a Libertarian, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug.
19, 2000, at 1B, available at LEXIS, News Library (stating that the Family Research Council is a
"conservative religious group"); Hanna Rosin and William Claiborne, Taking the
Commandments Public: Indiana Passes Bill Allowing Display in Schools, Other Government
Facilities, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2000, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library (discussing
"Hang Ten").
255
E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST.U. L. REv. 1183,
1200 (1994) ("When it speaks, government by its sheer size and sway will have a
disproportionate influence on public perceptions.").
256
Jabeen Bhatti, Statute Wars Have Roots in 1950's Hollywood; Commandments Displays at
Issue, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library (placing the
number of the monuments containing the Ten Commandments at "4000 or so"). Apparently, the
markers have their origin in a 1946 Minnesota case where a judge found that a juvenile boy had
never heard of the Ten Commandments. Id. After this discovery, the judge began an effort in
conjunction with the Fraternal Order of Eagles to post the Ten Commandments in courts across
the country. Id. The story took a turn straight out of Hollywood, literally, in 1956. Id. In that
year, Cecil B. DeMille remade "The Ten Commandments" and took the opportunity to promote
his film and what he viewed as morality. Id. Utilizing a design similar to that in the movie, a
number of stone monuments containing the Ten Commandments were manufactured and cast
members such as Charlton Heston and Yul Brynner traveled the nation to donate the markers that
serve as the focal points for many modem cases. Id. Despite their extended stay on public
property, "no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use,
even when the span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it." Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970); see also Nancy Lofhom, Ten Commandments:
254
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of these monuments assert that the monuments are nothing more
than an exercise of the right to free speech. In fact, "the free speech
strategy has proven effective with judges across the ideological
spectrum against opponents who rely on the
First Amendment's
257
clause against the establishment of religion.,
In addition to taking shelter under Pinette, "Hang Ten" and other
groups with a similar agenda also attempt to put distance between
their displays and an impermissible establishment of religion by
arguing that the displays convey no religious messages whatsoever.
Typically, advocates of displays point out that the religious messages
of monuments containing religious symbols are diluted by the
contents of the monuments themselves. For example, a controversial
7-foot tall monument in the shape of two stone tablets to be placed
on the lawn of the Indiana Statehouse not only contained the Ten
Commandments, but also portions of the Bill of Rights and the
Indiana Constitution. 258 Similarly, sponsors of "Foundation Rock,"
a monument to be erected by a Florida community, planned "to
dilute the Ten Commandments within a larger canon of as many as
15 other documents" of historical significance.2 59 As a result,
supporters of these monuments maintain that the monoliths are not
designed to influence religious choices but instead recognize the role
of religion in the nation's history.260 And even without historical
Historical or Religious? Grand Junction Debates Whether Granite Tablet Should Stay at City
Hall, DENVER POST, Feb. 26, 2001, at B-4, available at LEXIS, News Library (stating that the
Eagles donated "hundreds-some say thousands-of these tablets to communities across the
country."); John Rivera, ChristiansPushing to Hang Ten, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT)
Feb. 26, 2000, at El, availableat LEXIS, News Library (noting that in addition to its advocacy
of monuments containing the Ten Commandments, "Hang Ten" also distributed 175,000 book
covers to students with the Ten Commandments on them). Furthermore, "Hang Ten" is not the
only group that actively supports displays of the Ten Commandments on public property.
Another such group is the Ten Commandments Project. Id.
57
1 Gustav Niebuhr, Conservatives'New Frontier: Religious Liberty Law Firms,N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 1995, at AI, availableat LEXIS, News Library (attributing the statement to Jay Sekulow,
former chief counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice). Pat Robertson now holds the
position. Id.
25
Ind. Civ. Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
O'Bannon v. Ind. Civ. Liberties Union, 122 S.Ct. 1173 (2002).
259
Billy Townsend, No Sign of Accord on Commandments Display; Key Could Be Whether
They're Displayed Alone or in a Collection, THE LEDGER (Lakeland, FL), Feb. 17, 2002 at A1,
availableat LEXIS, News Library.
2
6Rev. Brian Henry, The Plaque Should Stay, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 2001, at
B-3, available at LEXIS, News Library (asserting that the country was founded on Christian
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references, proponents of religious monuments never fail to invent a

secular purpose for their placement. For example, those in favor of
retaining a 12-foot cross on a water tower in Mendelson v. City of St.
Cloud urged that removing the cross would be dangerous because it
served as a landmark for fisherman and pilots 261 while a 26x35 foot
Latin cross standing in a state park allegedly promoted tourism
according to the defendants in ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of
Commerce.262 In sum, proponents of religious displays concoct any
number of justifications that serve to dissociate the religious symbol

from its religious import.
Regardless of the camouflage used, monuments like the one

proposed in Indiana are most accurately seen as efforts to proselytize
on behalf of the religion associated with the symbol, which is more

often than not Christianity. In the case of a "Hang Ten-like"
monument, for example, the religious symbol at issue is a
representation of the Decalogue because it is undeniably a sacred
text communicating religious tenets. 263
If "Hang Ten-like"
monuments truly represented acknowledgements of the significance
of religion in the nation's history, the monuments would be
developed with that end in mind. But contrary to their supposed
historical panorama, many monuments are altered to find the right
mix of religious and historical material that will allow the monument
to pass Establishment Clause muster. Often, "it's simply a matter of
finding the right display." 264 For example, leaders in Wilkesboro,
principles and displaying the Ten Commandments serves as a reminder of the religious origin of
the nation); Robert Siegel, Legal Fight in Kentucky and Indianato Display Ten Commandments
on Grounds of State Capitols, All Things Considered(NPR radio broadcast, August 25, 2000)
(According to a Kentucky state senator, hanging the Ten Commandments was part of a historical
and cultural display because "no one can deny that the Ten Commandments are historical.");
Terry Home, Commandments Display ChallengedAgain; ICLU Files Lawsuit, the Third Such in
Indiana,In Washington County on Behalf of a Libertarian,INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 19, 2000,
at 1B, availableat LEXIS, News Library (noting that a desire to post the Ten Commandments as
part of historical displays motivated a bill to allow the posting of the Decalogue); Matt Moline,
Monument Stirs Little Debate, TOPEKA CAPITOL J., July 24, 2000, available at LEXIS, News
Library (containing a statement by a local politician asserting that the founders "used the Ten
Commandments as a blueprint-for eternity, almost").
261719 F. Supp. 1065, 1066 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
262698 F.2d 1098, 1101 n.1, 1109 (lth Cir. 1983) (the cross also allegedly served as a
memorial).
263
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
264
Townsend, supra note 259 at Al.
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North Carolina, offered to add the Declaration of Independence and
the Magna Carta to a Ten Commandments display in response to
litigation regarding the constitutionality of the display of the
Decalogue by itself.265 Furthermore, the Governor of Mississippi
admitted that secular symbols were added to an image of a Latin
cross created with lights on a state-owned twenty-story building in
Jackson, Mississippi, in an attempt to make the display
constitutional.266 The bottom line for those seeking to erect a
religiously motivated display is that "if at first you don't succeed,
try, try again."
Instances like these are readily distinguishable from other
religious symbols in public places that truly depict the historical
intersections between law and religion. The best example of such a
representation is the relief that adorns the interior of the Supreme
Court itself. The frieze on the south wall of the Court contains a
number of images representing great lawgivers, including Moses
holding the Ten Commandments, Solomon, Lycurgus, Confucius,
Hammurabi, and Octavian. 267 Although many of these classical
figures are rather obscure for just about any and all viewers, the
motivating idea for the relief was to depict the progression of law
from ancient through modem times.2 68 Contrary to the intention of
the Supreme Court frieze, the constant chiseling of "Hang Ten-like"
monuments demonstrates that their true aim is not to illustrate
history but to convey a religious message among historical
documents by launching so many combinations of symbols at
Jefferson's wall like groups of clay pigeons to see which
arrangement will surmount the obstacle. In plain terms, the
incessant physical metamorphosis of many proposed monuments
demonstrates that their true aim is not to serve as ceremonial bows to
26 5

Other Documents Added to Courthouse Display, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14, 2000 at
A 14, availableat LEXIS, News Library.
266
ACLU v. Miss. State Gen. Servs. Admin., 652 F. Supp. 380, 381-82 (S.D. Miss. 1987)
(describing the added symbols as including bells, a Christmas tree, and a large sign containing
the words "Joy" and "Peace"); see also ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting that the Ten Commandments display had been altered); ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F.
Supp. 2d 691, 693 n. I (E.D. Ky. 2000) (Ten Commandments display changed post-injunction).
26 7
1nformation Sheet, Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, August 18,
2000. Also included in the south wall frieze are Menes (one of the earliest individuals denoted as
a lawgiver), Solon (an Athenian lawgiver), and Draco (an Athenian who was first to write down
on paper).
laws268
1d

212

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

history but rather to gain governmental imprimatur for a religious
message. The end result is that a symbol held sacred by adherents
becomes a pedestrian, non-sacred pawn
in a power struggle with
269
Establishment Clause interpretation.
Given the religiosity of the controversial monuments enumerating
the Ten Commandments, the issue becomes whether the placement
of "Hang Ten-like" monuments on public property violates the
Establishment Clause in light of Pinette's balance of free speech
versus establishment. Although still subject to criticism, Pinette is
understandable within the context of its facts and the display at issue.
Even if the endorsement test applied to the forum in Pinette, the
appearance of governmental approval is reduced because of the
temporary nature of the displays at issue. The KKK received
270
permission to place its cross on the Square for only two months.
Christmas decorations and menorahs are similarly transient because
they commemorate seasonal events. Furthermore, the KKK's cross
constituted only one of several displays on the same piece of
government property throughout the year.271 Once the KKK and
other churches removed their crosses, other displays undoubtedly
took their places just as Christmas decorations rapidly give way to
those reminding consumers of Valentine's Day. In short, the
appearance of governmental support is drastically reduced because
regular observers of the forum are less likely to transfer
governmental approval of the messages if all of the messages
emanating from the forum change in a regular fashion.
Unlike the temporary nature of the displays in Pinette and like
cases, however, "Hang Ten" and others seek to display religious
symbols in a manner best characterized as permanent. As evidence
26

9Schundler, 168 F.3d at 96 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that in denying the preliminary
injunction, the lower court stated that "by making these additions, defendants have sufficiently
demystified the [holy], they have sufficiently desanctified sacred symbols, and they have
sufficiently deconsecrated the sacred.") (alteration in original).
27
°Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 759 (1995). That is not
to say, however, that an impermissible endorsement could never be attributed to a temporary
display. One might imagine a sudden flood of Latin crosses appearing in front of the statehouse
for a very brief time with the permission of the government that would appear to violate
Establishment Clause principles. Moreover, one might imagine that a government might only
allow the display of a creche for a short time and consistently reject applications by Jewish
groups to display a menorah in the same area, which would seem to be equally impermissible.
27
Id. at 809 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (for example, local craftsmen and the United Way had
displays on the Square).
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of their permanency, sponsors donate sizable monuments that would
be expensive and/or arduous to remove if only intended to be
of
temporary. For example, sponsors erected a 6-foot tall monument 272
Kansas
in
lawn
courthouse
a
adorn
to
Commandments
the Ten
while donors fashioned a 4-foot tall plaque enumerating the
Decalogue to affix to an exterior wall of a Pennsylvania
courthouse. 27 3 Obviously, neither the donors of the 7-foot tall
monument accepted for display by the state of Indiana nor the state
of Indiana itself intended for the massive stone tablets to be placed
on the statehouse lawn for only a month or two. In fact, during a
speech to accept the donated monument, the Governor of Indiana
stated that the monument was to be "an integral part of the
,274 Thus, these monuments are permanent
Statehouse setting .
and not holiday adornments representing speech limited in time.
Recognizing the constancy of the messages conveyed by the
singular, permanent monuments displayed at the seat of government
calls into question Pinette's tipping of the First Amendment balance
in favor of free speech based upon equal access to a public forum.
Unlike the usual transitory nature of messages in the crowded public
forum, recent sponsors of lone, unattended religious monuments
usurp part of the public forum into a permanent platform for their
thinly veiled religious messages. Given the dimensions of the
monuments, other speakers cannot utilize the same space for their
expressive conduct. However, the "Court has never held that a
private party has a right to place an unattended object in a public
forum., 2 75 Furthermore, even Justice Kennedy recognized "that the
Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large
Latin cross on the roof of city hall .... because such an obtrusive
year-round religious display would place the government's weight
behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular

272

Matt Moline, Monument Stirs Little Debate, TOPEKA CAPITAL J., July 24, 2000, available
at LEXIS, News Library.
" 3 Jane Eisner, There's No Denying Religious Nature of Ten Commandments, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 10, 2002, at E2, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/archives/ (last
visited January 7, 2003).
4
11 Ind. Civ. Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2001) cert. denied,
O'Bannon v. Ind. Civ. Liberties Union, 122 S.Ct. 1173 (2002).
275
Pinete,515 U.S. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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religion., 27 6 As the Court noted in Engel v. Vitale, "[w]hen the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind
a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities
to conform to the prevailing officially approved
277
religion is plain."
In that light, the constitutionality of a monument bearing a
religious message cannot turn on whether the monument
permanently stands on the roof or on the state/courthouse lawn.
Instead, the permissibility of "Hang Ten-like" monuments turns on
the length of time each monument is allowed to be displayed. If
overtly religious symbols may become secularized with time,
thereby losing their religious import,278 then religious messages
placed permanently on public grounds possess the power to become
associated with governmental approval as time passes because the
road presumably runs both directions. Moreover, government
officials clearly possess the power to regulate which monuments are
placed in locations at the seat of government characterized as public
forums. For example, the KKK had to apply for permission to erect
its cross on the Square, and donors in Plattsmouth, Nebraska, had to
apply for permission to construct a permanent Ten Commandments
monument on public property in that small community. 279 As a
result, observers justifiably conclude that the lawns of statehouses
and courthouses, much like the Grand Staircase in Allegheny, are not
the types of places where individuals may just plant any monument
without governmental approval. Contrary to Pinette's assertion,
observers are not making mistakes regarding which monuments
..6 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777, 778 (10th Cir.
1985) (en banc); ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1100-11
(1lth Cir. 1983); Lowe v. City of Eugene, 463 P.2d 360, 544 (1969)).
277370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
118See generally Alexandra D. Furth, Comment, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 584 (1998)
(characterizing secularization as the process by which religious symbols lose their religiosity
with the passage of time or within certain contexts).
279
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 758-59; ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1027
(D. Neb. 2002) (noting that permanent markers may not be placed on public lands in Nebraska
without prior governmental permission); see also Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 910
(10th Cir. 1997) (noting that Summun, a church formed in Utah, petitioned to have a monument
containing its tenets placed on the county courthouse's front lawn next to a Ten Commandments
monolith).
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receive governmental approval but instead are concluding correctly
that those monuments that never leave the public forum remain there
with the imprimatur of the government. Rather than being a
disinterested observer of speech at its doorstep, state action keeps a
close eye on the permanent messages conveyed on its property. In
the public forum, then, a threat to Establishment Clause values stems
from the duration of religious speech regardless of location.
But by inoculating free speech in public forums against the
endorsement test without regard to the duration of a given display,
Pinette ignites a competition for display space on the public lawn.
Pinette provides religious groups with a competitive opportunity to
set up displays using religious symbols to get their unique messages
out vis d vis those of other displays, particularly those affiliated with
other religious groups. Once the governmental body grants
permission for one monument with a religious symbol, it cannot
deny the applications of others without violating the neutral principle
of equal access to the public forum. In Pinette, for example, the
KKK sought to place its cross on the square "because 'the Jews'
were placing 'a symbol for the Jewish belief'" on the property.28 °
After the KKK planted its cross, a local church petitioned the Board
for permission to erect its own cross "for the purpose of
overwhelming the Klan's cross." 28' Placed in a tough position, the
Board subsequently invited all local churches associated with the
local council to erect a display, which ultimately created a Square
"strewn with crosses., 282 In the end, a self-perpetuating race for the
forum develops that threatens to clog the forum with competing
religious messages as rival religious sects joust for space on public
property in the name of free speech.

28

Pinelle, 515 U.S. at 797. The symbol that evoked the KKK's response was the display of
a menorah during the season of Chanukah. Id. at n.2.
...
ld.at 792.
22
1d. (noting that the Opposition's brief termed the invitation "blanket permission" for "all
churches friendly to or affiliated with" the particular church council that initiated the petition to
erect a cross); see also, e.g., ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 224 (S.D. Tex 1984)
(explaining that members of the Jewish community in Houston petitioned to have a Star of David
erected in a public park after Latin crosses were already standing on the property); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 702 (1984) ( "Jews and other non-Christian groups... can be expected
to press government for inclusion of their symbols, and faced with such requests, government
will have to become involved in accommodating the various demands.").
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While free speech deserves its lofty constitutional status, the
threat to Establishment Clause values emerges from the shadow of
the Free Speech Clause when religious groups are permitted to plant
permanent religious messages on the public lawn. Simply put, "a
private religious group may so dominate a public forum that a formal
policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of
approval., 283 To that end, a government certainly cannot allow "a
religious group to turn a public park into an enormous church"
without running afoul of the Establishment Clause. 28 4 Within the
context of the current religious display cases involving the Ten
Commandments, monuments erected at the behest of the majority
religious tradition dominate the public forum. The symbols that
incite controversy are generally those of Christendom. For instance,
Pinette involved a Square "strewn with crosses" from various local
churches, not a forum wallpapered with the Wiccan Rede. Indeed, a
controversy surrounding a symbolic representation of Buddha,
Shiva, or any other non-Christian deity on the statehouse lawn is
mere fantasy because those symbols remain on the sidelines of the
public forum. In that light, permitting rival religious sects to
compete for the public lawn contravenes a basic purpose of the
Establishment Clause-to end "the war of all sects against all"-that
dominated the
political and cultural landscapes of both England and
2 85
the colonies.
Like many conflicts, "the war of all sects against all" is not
played on a level field but is instead skewed in favor of the majority
faith. To that end, the absence of symbols reflecting the richness of
this nation's religious pluralism is not due to a lack of adherents of
non-majority faith traditions. Again, 14.1% of the population
(approximately 26.6 million people) follows a religion other than
Christianity or no religion at all.2 86 The reason that other
representations fail to make their way into the public forum is that
those who make decisions regarding placement of monuments pick
and choose among the messages to observers on public land in a
manner favorable to the majority faith. For example, a small church
3

28Pinette 515 U.S. at 777; see also Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 625 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating

that domination "degenerates into endorsement").
254
Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611,625 (7th Cir. 1992).
25

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religious Participationin Public Programs: Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 197-98 (1992).
2 6
U.S. News & World Report, supra note 27 at 43.
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in Utah, Summum, requested permission from the Salt Lake City
city council to post a monument with church tenets next to a
monolith of the Ten Commandments that stood on the front lawn of
the county courthouse. 287 The council denied the request claiming
that the property was to be developed for a jail or other new
buildings inconsistent with the addition of Summum's monument.288
Reading between the lines, the city council simply refused to allow
the county to be associated with whatever message was conveyed by
Summum's monument. Similarly, it is rather fanciful to imagine
that a governmental body would accept a display of either the Quran
in the aftermath of September 11th or allow a giant swastika to be
posted on the lawn of a government building even though it may
serve as a religious symbol. 289 Thus, equal access is not a neutral
policy but rather one that blocks alternative monuments from being
placed on the public lawn by providing the majority with a method
to dictate which symbols gain access to the public forum.
Despite the absence of representations of their faiths, members of
non-majority faiths are loathe to object to long-standing majority
symbols on public property. However, "the silence of religious
290
minorities may signal something quite different from disinterest.
When it comes to alleging a transgression of the Establishment
287 Summum v.Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1997).
28

81d. In fact, Summum applied for permission to erect a monument a total of three times but

the council failed to respond to the last two requests. Id. at 911. Sumrnmum also contacted Salt
Lake City officials in an effort to procure permission for its monument, but city officials simply
replied that decisions regarding the placement of monuments remained with the county. Id. at
n.5; see also Bob Mims, Judge Rules Sect Can't Place Tenets Near Ten Commandments in
Ogden; Summum Sect Can't Place Tenets Near Courthouse, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 2, 2001, at
Al, available at LEXIS, News Library (noting that apparently, the modifications to the grounds
did not occur, as the county vacated the area and the existing Ten Commandments display was
removed); Gentleman, supra note 42 (reporting that Judge Moore denied a request from
African-American groups to place a plaque of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I Have a
Dream" speech in the courthouse and refused to place a representation of an atom on courthouse
space on behalf of an atheist group).
2 9
" Daniel Parish, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 286
(1994) (stating that "[a] swastika can serve both as a reminder of Nazi tyranny and as a symbol of
Buddhism."); see also Colorado v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013, 1048
(Colo. 1995) (quoting Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 665 (1978), which referred to
the "Jain swastika" as a religious symbol).
29 0
Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1567 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied by Joyner v. Hewitt,
502 U.S. 1073; Fox, 587 P.2d 663, 666 (1978) (discussing the city attorney's observation that
citizens of Los Angeles had failed to complain about the lighting of a cross for over 30 years).
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Clause, that something else is the fear of the consequences and
291
persecution that follow public dissent from the majority view.
Those opposed to the mixture of religion and government
propagated by these religious displays quickly find that they are on
the front lines of the church/state controversy and are subject to
public derision. Astutely, supporters of majoritarian religious
displays on public land marry law and religion thereby making any
opposition to the marriage appear to be a vote for an amoral society,
at least as defined by Christian principles. As a result, individuals
who object to the mixture of government and religion represented in
these monuments are automatically labeled as "barbarians
ransacking America" or "anti-Christian" by supporters of the
displays.292 Worse yet, the antagonistic sentiment against dissent
from the goals of "Hang Ten" caused a South Carolina official to
exclaim "screw the Buddhists and kill the Muslims" at a public
meeting.293 In sum, dissent from the practice of posting symbols of
the majority faith on public land subjects one to a public flogging in
the form of a stream of invective criticism.
Unfortunately, public derision is not the only social punishment
risked by those who believe that monuments on public lands that
contain religious symbols or messages violate the Establishment
Clause. After winning the removal of a Ten Commandments plaque
from the side of a Pennsylvania county courthouse, for example, a
plaintiff received a number of threatening telephone and email

291

Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A Discussion of Religion 's Role in the
Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 610 (1995) ("Victims of religious liberty
violations do not want even to file a claim in court, even when we assure them they would win,
because of the hostility, enmity, persecution, and attacks they would face."); see also Steven B.
Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionalityof Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2171
(1996) ("The ostracism that befalls plaintiffs who challenge cherished governmental
endorsements of religion is so extreme that most who are offended by these practices bite their
tongues and go about their lives.").
292
Steve Benen, The Ten Commandments Crusade, CHURCH & ST., May 1, 1999, at 9,
available at LEXIS, News Library (containing the "barbarians" remark, among others); Ed
Matusek, On Christianity: What the FoundingFathersMeant, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 9,
2000 at 3J, availableat LEXIS, News Library.
293
Lyn Riddle, Ten Commandments: S.C. Council Enters Display Fray, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., June 5, 1997, at 13A, available at LEXIS, News Library (quoting the statement of a
South Carolina Board of Education member).
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messages including one that said, "[y]ou're going to get it." 294
Threats of this nature cannot be taken lightly given the experiences
of others who took positions on the church/state divide contrary to
the majority. In Oklahoma, the negative consequences for filing an
Establishment Clause claim regarding religious practices in public
schools included taping upside-down crosses on the lockers of the
plaintiffs children and a physical attack from a school employee in
the form of banging the plaintiffs head against a car door. 295 While
these might be extreme examples, the warning for rocking the boat is
made clear to those who would do so-object at your own risk.
Because of the state action in the form of choosing the messages
permanently housed on the public forum and the risk of harm that
accompanies those choices, the government shoulders some
modicum of responsibility for avoiding mistakes involving message
sponsorship, particularly with regard to permanent, unattended
displays. By allowing the majority to control access to the public
lawn pursuant to a facially neutral policy, the state fosters exactly the
type of mistaken transference of endorsement from private sponsor
to the government rebuked in Pinette. Fortunately, the government
possesses the ability to readjust the First Amendment balance in the
form of reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on speech in
public forums. Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions do not
restrict a speaker's message, but instead regulate when, where, or
how a speaker may communicate a given message.296 Pursuant to its
regulatory ability, a ban on privately sponsored, permanent
monuments displaying religious symbols realigns the crucial values
of free speech and establishment in the First Amendment scales. A
ban (when) of this nature simply prohibits a group from speaking via
294

Steve Benen, Ten Commandments Fever: Decalogue Advocates Turn Up the Heat with
Legislation in Congress, State Legislatures, CHURCH & ST., Apr. 1, 2002, at 4, available at
LEXIS, News Library; see also, Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.C.
1988) (noting that the plaintiff received threats after objecting to a cross on public property);
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., v. Zielke, 663 F. Supp. 606, 608 (W.D. Wis. 1987)
(recalling that one of the plaintiffs in a lawsuit regarding a display of the Ten Commandments in
a public park received threats after initiating the litigation).
295
Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 427, 456 (1997). The family hog also had its throat slit by someone who obviously
objected to the litigation. Id. In addition to these wrongs, someone set fire to the family home,
completely destroying it. Id.
296
William Van Alstyne, A GraphicReview of the FreeSpeech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107,
126 (1982).
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a permanent display (how) on government owned property (where).
Furthermore, a ban on permanent displays is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression in that it prohibits both religious and
non-religious groups from placing permanent monuments on the
public lawn. 29 7 Moreover, the prohibition on permanent displays is
justifiable apart from its regulation of speech in that it prevents the
visual clutter on government property that accompanies an open
door policy regarding permanent displays. 29 8 A ban on unattended,
permanent displays simply prevents the public lawn from being
"strewn with crosses."
While a ban on permanent displays curtails speech, it only limits
a very specific manner of communication and leaves ample channels
of communication available to speakers in the public forum,
including those who desire to convey a religious message. For
example, holiday displays involving religious symbolism fall outside
the purview of a ban on permanent displays because they are only
temporary.
Similarly, brief displays promoting specific
community-wide goals, such as a sign bearing a thermometer
representing a United Way campaign, 29 9 are also beyond the reach of
the ban. Moreover, nothing prevents religious groups, or any other
group for that matter, from gathering on the steps of the statehouse
to preach their views with the aid of placards, leaflets, bullhorns, or
other modes of communication. Thus, the ban is narrowly tailored
to resuscitate the compelling interest protected by the Establishment
Clause 30 0 in the face of the subterfuge perpetrated by permanent
monuments under the guise of free speech.
Feeling under attack whenever any speech limitation is proposed,
religious groups emphatically denounce any attempt to limit their
messages as an "ill-disguised hostility towards religion." 30 1 Given
that the majority of the controversies revolve around Christian
symbols, vocal Christians instinctively characterize any regulation
297

United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (discussing requirement of
content-neutral restrictions).
2 98
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816-17 (1984)
(upholding a prohibition on the posting of political signs on public property).
299
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 809 (1995).
30
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (avoiding an Establishment Clause violation
may be a "compelling" state interest).
301 Mary Ann Glendon, Religious Freedom and Common Sense, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997
at All.
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on religious speech as an effort to remove God from society and as
an infringement on their way of life.3 °2 From their perspective,
advocates see no endorsement of religion by planting permanent
monuments bearing religious messages on public grounds but
instead believe that they are "standing with the Bible."30 3 Objections
to speech limitations that invoke religion or the Bible, however, belie
the true intention underlying the monuments. If, as proponents
claim, monuments that include religious symbols only pay tribute to
history, then their prohibition cannot be properly characterized as
anti-religion but instead as being anti-history. In other words, if the
presence of the controversial monuments have zero preference for
one religion over another or for religion over non-religion, then the
negative is also true-the absence of the monuments have zero
preference for one religion over another or for non-religion over
religion. As a result, reasonable regulations of religious speech like
that advocated by "Hang Ten" are not hostile to one particular
religion or religion in general but instead defend the rich religious
diversity of this nation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the present neutral policy of equal access to a forum
without governmental support seems benign, surface equality
Plessy v. Ferguson's
frequently masks underlying inequality.
hid the marked
doctrine
equal"
but
"separate
of
the
embrace
differences between the races traceable to segregation until Brown30v.4
Board of Education shed light on the injustice and put it asunder.
Similarly, the Court found injustice in the form of vote dilution in
cases like Reynolds v. Sims even though each citizen ostensibly

32

° Honorable Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB.L. REV. 347, 358, 368
(1998/99); see also Amy Bayer, Fighting Words Cost Buchanan; While Critics Assail His
In-Your-Face Rhetoric, He Remains Unapologetic, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 12, 1996, at
B12, availableat LEXIS, News Library (recalling Buchanan's claim that "Christian-bashing is a
popular indoor sport").
33
° Bob Fowler, Ten Commandments can be Posted, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTrNEL, July 25,
1999, at AC6, available at LEXIS, News Library.
3
1 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494-95 (1954) (finding the "separate but equal" doctrine to be unconstitutional).
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possessed equal access to the voting booth itself.30 5 To that end, the
Reynolds Court reminded the country that "the Constitution forbids
'sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination'. 30 6
The same is true of the neutral policies of equal access for all
religious speakers in religious display cases arising in public forums.
Simply put, neutrality is a concept limited by the personal
predilections of those who implement policy. Those who decide
what monuments are displayed at the seat of government invariably
favor some religious displays over others. Given that the vast
majority of citizens are Christians, odds are that the Christian
symbols of the majority faith receive favorable treatment and the
evidence shows that symbols associated with Christianity dominate
the public forum.
Summum's tenets of "psychokinesis,
correspondence, vibration, opposition, rhythm, cause and effect, and
gender" are not going to be placed on a monument near the seat of
government or in a courtroom at any time in the near future pursuant
to a policy of equal access that promotes religious tolerance. 30 7 If
adherents of minority faiths in this country, such as Hindus, petition
for inclusion of their monuments on public property, the far more
likely result is that they will be met with a response30 reminding
them
8
rock.
own
their
up
put
"to
India
to
go
that they can
305377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (concerning an equal protection challenge to the application of a

1903 Alabama legislative apportionment scheme in light of population changes). The Court
famously announced that "legislators represent people, not trees or acres" and added:
[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be
given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another
part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in
the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.
Id; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968) (applying the "one person-one vote"
standard of Reynolds to a county in Texas).
36
° Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563 (citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)); Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960)).
30
TBob Mims, Judge Rules Sect Can't Place Tenets Near Ten Commandments in Ogden;
Summum Sect Can't Place Tenets Near Courthouse, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 2, 2001, at Al,
availableat LEXIS, News Library.
308
Townsend, supra note 259, at Al (continuing that "[w]e certainly don't owe Hindus or
Islam (a place on the.., monument.)");
see also Inflaming Intolerance, LOUISVILLE
COURIER-J., Feb. 17, 2000, at 10A (noting that supporters of posting Christian symbols justify
the exclusion of symbols associated with other religions by announcing that the boats that came
to this land did not hold atheists, Buddhists, or Hindus, but instead carried Christians who
traveled in search of a land to practice their religion).
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Regardless of any proclaimed religious tolerance, sentiments like
"if you don't like it, then leave" reflect the religious intolerance
percolating beneath the surface of placid neutral policies. A facially
neutral policy that allows domination of a public forum near the seat
of government by the permanent religious messages of one religious
tradition in the absence of others prefers some religious sects over
others and, at the very least, favors religion over nonreligion. As a
result, the jurisprudentially hypothesized neutral policy of equal
access promotes the idea that there are "ins" and "outs" and is not
truly neutral in reality.30 9 In addition to feelings of exclusion, 310 the
domination of the public forum to the detriment of the "outs" affects
the physical behavior of some outside the religious majority. 31' In
Jewish War Veterans v. United States, for example, one Jewish
individual altered his travel route to avoid seeing a Latin cross on
U.S. Navy
property because the cross made him feel like an
"alien." 31 2 Trying to remedy this sense of exclusion in their
community, officials in a small Georgia town altered the Ten
Commandments display in their community.
The improved
monument contained the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer,
and a single, empty frame engraved with the words "[t]his is for
those of other beliefs ....
All of the other faith traditions in that
3

°9Barry W. Lynn, Ten Commandments Don't Belong on Your Courthouse, PITTSBURGH

POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 31, 2000, at E- 1, availableat LEXIS, News Library.
3
l°Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1997) (reporting that an atheist
feared that the law would not be applied fairly to him after seeing a Ten Commandments display
behind a courtroom bench).
3 11
Ray Suarez, Legislation Passed Allowing the Ten Commandments To Be Displayed in
Public Buildings, Talk of the Nation (National Public Radio broadcast, June 21, 1999)
(containing a letter pointing out that Muslim youths are not only subject to derision for the way
they dress, but also feel a sense of exclusion as a result of Christian displays of the Ten
Commandments on government property); see also Jeffrey Cohan, A Man of Conviction;
Avowed Atheist Questions Legality of Documents, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 2001, at
A-9, available at LEXIS, News Library (describing an atheist's feelings of exclusion in response
to a Ten Commandments display on the wall of a courthouse); Jeffrey L. Sheler, The Mormon
Moment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 13, 2000, at 64, available at LEXIS, News
Library (describing the ostracism experienced by some individuals in Utah and the West when
others discovered that they were not Mormon).
312695 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.C. 1988); see also Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d
679, 682 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that a portrait of Jesus Christ in a public school impaired the
usage of the facility by non-adherents).
3t3
Dahleen Glanton, Crusadingfor a Christian Nation; Groups Across the Country Are
Defying the Courts and Invoking Patriotismas They Fightfor Displays of the 10 Commandments
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community got one small frame next to two undeniably Christian
symbols, which does nothing to promote a sense of inclusion or
advance the ideal of religious tolerance within the community. If
anything, an offering of that nature further isolates members of
non-majority religions. To combat the exclusion fostered by the
dominance of the public forum allowed under existing government
policy, the only remedy that is truly neutral is to ban all permanent
religious messages from public grounds. In the end, banning "Hang
Ten-like" displays is a reasonable weight to add to the First
Amendment balance in an effort to return free speech and
establishment to the neutral position of a standoff.
In addition to its promotion of meaningful neutrality, a ban on
permanent religious markers bearing religious messages begins to
correct a fundamental failure of the law in this important
area-predictability. Rather than ordering private or group affairs in
accordance with legal principles, the unstable tangle of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence actually promotes efforts to
circumnavigate the law precisely because of the uncertainty of the
outcome. As a result, groups with religious agendas push the
envelope with their displays and those bold enough to object find
themselves engaged in protracted and costly litigation over the
constitutionality of the displays.
However, the abundance of
litigation over these displays wastes the resources of both
parties-not to mention those of the courts. Religious groups might
better use their resources more efficiently and effectively on
proselytizing efforts that do not force a constitutional collision, such
as handing out flyers to passerby on the sidewalk, and the same is
true of those who object to the public representations. Implementing
a ban on permanent markers levels a currently uneven playing field
by making clear that any and all such displays are impermissible and
resolves this particular church/state battle. As a result, resources can
be allocated to the next major Establishment Clause issue because
unlike the uncertainty of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
general, one thing that is sure is that there is another major
church/state issue looming on the horizon.

and School Prayer, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 10, 2001, at Zone N, p.1, available at LEXIS, News
Library.

